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71 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
71 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
import type { Envelope } from '@prisma/client';
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import { EnvelopeType } from '@prisma/client';
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import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';
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import { mapSecondaryIdToDocumentId, mapSecondaryIdToTemplateId } from '../utils/envelope';
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export const alphaid = customAlphabet('0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz', 21);
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export { nanoid } from 'nanoid';
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export const fancyId = customAlphabet('abcdefhiklmnorstuvwxyz', 16);
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export const prefixedId = (prefix: string, length = 16) => {
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return `${prefix}_${fancyId(length)}`;
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};
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type DatabaseIdPrefix =
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| 'document'
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| 'template'
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| 'envelope'
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| 'envelope_item'
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| 'envelope_content'
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| 'data'
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| 'email_domain'
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| 'email_transport'
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| 'org'
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| 'org_email'
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| 'org_monthly_stat'
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| 'org_claim'
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| 'org_group'
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| 'org_sso'
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| 'org_setting'
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| 'member'
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| 'member_invite'
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| 'group_member'
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| 'team_group'
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| 'team_setting';
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/**
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* Generate a database ID with the given prefix, e.g. `data_kfxwsemrhvbtlnuc`.
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*
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* ## Security note: some IDs double as access tokens
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*
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* Some of these IDs (e.g. `data`) are deliberately treated as a shared
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* secret: the same ID may be referenced from multiple places (a data content
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* shared between a template and the documents created from it), and knowing
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* the ID may be enough to fetch what it points to, without a further
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* ownership check.
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*
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* This is by design and is not considered a vulnerability. The random part
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* of the ID is 16 characters drawn from a 22 character alphabet by nanoid's
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* cryptographically secure generator, giving roughly 71 bits of entropy.
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* That is not enumerable or guessable, so the only way to know an ID is to
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* have already been given access to something which references it. Anyone
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* who can present the ID has therefore already seen the data, and no new
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* access is gained by "leaking" it. This is the same model as document
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* access tokens.
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*
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* Please do not report the reuse or exposure of these IDs as a security
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* issue on its own. A report needs to show a way to obtain an ID *without*
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* prior access to the data it references.
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*/
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export const generateDatabaseId = (prefix: DatabaseIdPrefix) => prefixedId(prefix, 16);
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export const extractLegacyIds = (envelope: Pick<Envelope, 'type' | 'secondaryId'>) => {
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return {
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documentId: envelope.type === EnvelopeType.DOCUMENT ? mapSecondaryIdToDocumentId(envelope.secondaryId) : null,
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templateId: envelope.type === EnvelopeType.TEMPLATE ? mapSecondaryIdToTemplateId(envelope.secondaryId) : null,
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};
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};
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