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111 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
111 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
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import { type User, UserSecurityAuditLogType } from '@prisma/client';
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import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '../../errors/app-error';
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import type { RequestMetadata } from '../../universal/extract-request-metadata';
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import { getBackupCodes } from './get-backup-code';
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import { verifyTwoFactorAuthenticationToken } from './verify-2fa-token';
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type EnableTwoFactorAuthenticationOptions = {
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user: Pick<User, 'id' | 'email' | 'twoFactorEnabled' | 'twoFactorSecret'>;
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code: string;
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/**
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* The session the enable request arrived on. A valid enable code proves
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* possession of the second factor, so this session is marked
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* `twoFactorVerified`. Other sessions of the same user intentionally stay
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* unverified — they must re-login to verify.
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*/
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sessionId: string;
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requestMetadata?: RequestMetadata;
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};
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export const enableTwoFactorAuthentication = async ({
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user,
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code,
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sessionId,
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requestMetadata,
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}: EnableTwoFactorAuthenticationOptions) => {
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if (user.twoFactorEnabled) {
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throw new AppError('TWO_FACTOR_ALREADY_ENABLED');
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}
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if (!user.twoFactorSecret) {
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throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.TWO_FACTOR_SETUP_REQUIRED);
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}
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const isValidToken = await verifyTwoFactorAuthenticationToken({ user, totpCode: code });
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if (!isValidToken) {
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throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.INCORRECT_TWO_FACTOR_CODE);
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}
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let recoveryCodes: string[] = [];
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await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
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// Conditional update: the write itself asserts 2FA is still disabled AND
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// the stored secret is the one the code was just verified against, so a
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// concurrent enable or setup-time secret rotation loses the race cleanly
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// instead of enabling 2FA with an unverified secret.
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const { count } = await tx.user.updateMany({
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where: {
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id: user.id,
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twoFactorEnabled: false,
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twoFactorSecret: user.twoFactorSecret,
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},
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data: {
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twoFactorEnabled: true,
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},
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});
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if (count === 0) {
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throw new AppError('TWO_FACTOR_ALREADY_ENABLED', {
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message:
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'Two-factor authentication is already enabled, or the setup was restarted after this code was issued. Restart setup and try again.',
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statusCode: 400,
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});
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}
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const updatedUser = await tx.user.findFirst({
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where: {
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id: user.id,
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},
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});
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if (!updatedUser) {
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throw new AppError('MISSING_BACKUP_CODE');
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}
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recoveryCodes = getBackupCodes({ user: updatedUser }) ?? [];
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if (recoveryCodes.length === 0) {
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throw new AppError('MISSING_BACKUP_CODE');
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}
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// `updateMany` so a session that expired mid-request is a noop rather
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// than a thrown P2025. The user filter guards against marking a session
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// that does not belong to this user.
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await tx.session.updateMany({
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where: {
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id: sessionId,
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userId: user.id,
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},
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data: {
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twoFactorVerified: true,
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},
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});
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await tx.userSecurityAuditLog.create({
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data: {
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userId: user.id,
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type: UserSecurityAuditLogType.AUTH_2FA_ENABLE,
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userAgent: requestMetadata?.userAgent,
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ipAddress: requestMetadata?.ipAddress,
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},
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});
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});
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return { recoveryCodes };
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};
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