feat: better ratelimiting (#2520)

Replace hono-rate-limiter with a Prisma/PostgreSQL bucketed counter
approach that works correctly across multiple instances without sticky
sessions.

- Add RateLimit model with composite PK (key, action, bucket) and atomic
upsert
- Create rate limit factory with window parsing, bucket computation, and
fail-open
- Define auth-tier and API-tier rate limit instances
- Add Hono middleware, rateLimitResponse helper, and tRPC
assertRateLimit helper
- Wire rate limit headers through AppError constructor (was declared but
never assigned)
- Apply rate limits to auth routes (email-password, passkey), tRPC
routes
  (2FA email, link org account), API routes, and file upload endpoints
- Add cleanup cron job for expired rate limit rows (batched delete every
15 min)
- Remove hono-rate-limiter dependency
This commit is contained in:
Lucas Smith
2026-02-20 12:23:02 +11:00
committed by GitHub
parent 006b1d0a57
commit 653ab3678a
21 changed files with 1218 additions and 62 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
---
date: 2026-02-19
title: Database Rate Limiting
---
## Summary
Replace the in-memory `hono-rate-limiter` with a database-backed rate limiting system using Prisma and PostgreSQL. The current in-memory approach is ineffective in multi-instance deployments since there are no sticky sessions. The new system uses **bucketed counters** (one row per key/action/time-bucket with atomic increment) to efficiently handle both high-throughput API rate limiting and granular auth/email rate limiting.
### Design Decisions
- **Bucketed counters** over row-per-request: high-throughput consumers would create thousands of rows per minute; bucketed counters reduce this to one row per key per time bucket
- **Fixed time windows**: simpler than sliding windows, the 2x burst-at-boundary scenario is acceptable for rate limiting purposes
- **Dual-key rate limiting**: per-identifier (`max`) and per-IP (`globalMax`) checked independently via separate rows with a `key` prefix (`id:` / `ip:`)
- **Accept slight over-count**: the upsert is atomic (increment + return count in one operation) but concurrent requests near the limit may both see a count just under the threshold before either commits, allowing a slight overshoot
- **Fail-open on errors**: if the rate limit DB query fails, allow the request through rather than blocking legitimate users
- **Prisma upsert** with `{ increment: 1 }` for atomic counter updates, returns the updated row so count check is a single operation
- **Application cron job** for cleanup of expired bucket rows
### Rate Limit Check Flow
```
check({ ip, identifier }) ->
1. Upsert IP row (ip:{ip} / action / bucket) with count + 1, RETURNING count
-> if globalMax is set and count >= globalMax, return { isLimited: true }
2. Upsert identifier row (id:{identifier} / action / bucket) with count + 1, RETURNING count
-> if count >= max, return { isLimited: true }
3. Neither limited -> return { isLimited: false }
```
Each upsert atomically increments and returns the new count in a single operation. Both counters always increment on every check — there's no conditional logic to skip one based on the other. This keeps the implementation simple and avoids read-then-write race conditions. If only IP is provided (API rate limiting), only step 1 runs.
---
## 1. Database Schema
### 1.1 Prisma model
Add to `packages/prisma/schema.prisma` after the `Counter` model:
```prisma
model RateLimit {
key String
action String
bucket DateTime
count Int @default(1)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@id([key, action, bucket])
@@index([createdAt])
}
```
- **Composite primary key** `(key, action, bucket)` serves as both the unique constraint for upserts and the lookup index
- **`key`** is prefixed: `ip:1.2.3.4` or `id:user@example.com`
- **`action`** is the rate limit action name: `auth.forgot-password`, `api.v1`, etc.
- **`bucket`** is the start of the time window, truncated to the window size (e.g., `2026-02-19T10:05:00Z` for a 5-minute bucket)
- **`createdAt` index** is for the cleanup job to efficiently delete old rows
- **`count`** starts at 1 (set by the create side of the upsert)
### 1.2 Migration
Generate with `npx prisma migrate dev --name add-rate-limits`.
---
## 2. Rate Limit Library
### 2.1 Core module
Create `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit.ts`:
```typescript
type WindowUnit = 's' | 'm' | 'h' | 'd';
type WindowStr = `${number}${WindowUnit}`;
type RateLimitConfig = {
action: string;
max: number;
globalMax?: number;
window: WindowStr;
};
type CheckParams = {
ip: string;
identifier?: string;
};
export const rateLimit = (config: RateLimitConfig) => {
return {
async check(params: CheckParams): Promise<{
isLimited: boolean;
remaining: number;
limit: number;
reset: Date;
}> { ... }
};
};
```
### 2.2 Window parsing and bucket computation
```typescript
const parseWindow = (window: WindowStr): number => {
const value = parseInt(window.slice(0, -1), 10);
const unit = window.slice(-1) as WindowUnit;
const multipliers: Record<WindowUnit, number> = {
s: 1000,
m: 60 * 1000,
h: 60 * 60 * 1000,
d: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
};
return value * multipliers[unit];
};
const getBucket = (windowMs: number): Date => {
const now = Date.now();
return new Date(now - (now % windowMs));
};
```
### 2.3 Check implementation
The `check()` method:
1. Compute the current bucket from the window
2. Compute `reset` as `bucket + windowMs` (the start of the next window)
3. If `globalMax` is set, upsert the IP row and check count
4. If `identifier` is provided, upsert the identifier row and check count
5. Wrap in try/catch — **fail-open** on any database error (log the error, return `{ isLimited: false }`)
Each upsert uses Prisma's `upsert` with `{ increment: 1 }`:
```typescript
const result = await prisma.rateLimit.upsert({
where: {
key_action_bucket: {
key: `ip:${params.ip}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
},
},
create: {
key: `ip:${params.ip}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
count: 1,
},
update: {
count: { increment: 1 },
},
});
if (config.globalMax && result.count >= config.globalMax) {
return { isLimited: true, remaining: 0, limit: config.globalMax };
}
```
### 2.4 Rate limit definitions
Create `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits.ts` with all rate limit instances:
```typescript
// ---- Auth (Tier 1 - Critical, sends emails) ----
export const signupRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.signup',
max: 5,
globalMax: 10,
window: '1h',
});
export const forgotPasswordRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.forgot-password',
max: 3,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const resendVerifyEmailRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.resend-verify-email',
max: 3,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const request2FAEmailRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.request-2fa-email',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '15m',
});
// ---- Auth (Tier 2 - Unauthenticated) ----
export const loginRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.login',
max: 10,
globalMax: 50,
window: '15m',
});
export const resetPasswordRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.reset-password',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const verifyEmailRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.verify-email',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '15m',
});
export const passkeyRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.passkey',
max: 10,
globalMax: 50,
window: '15m',
});
export const oauthRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.oauth',
max: 10,
globalMax: 50,
window: '15m',
});
export const linkOrgAccountRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'auth.link-org-account',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
// ---- API (Tier 4 - Standard) ----
export const apiV1RateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'api.v1',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const apiV2RateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'api.v2',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const apiTrpcRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'api.trpc',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const aiRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'api.ai',
max: 3,
window: '1m',
});
export const fileUploadRateLimit = rateLimit({
action: 'api.file-upload',
max: 20,
window: '1m',
});
```
Exact limits are initial values — tune based on observed traffic patterns. These should be easy to adjust.
---
## 3. Integration Points
### 3.1 Hono middleware for API routes
Create a reusable Hono middleware factory in `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware.ts` that wraps the `rateLimit` checker into Hono middleware:
```typescript
import { type MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
import { getIpAddress } from '@documenso/lib/universal/get-ip-address';
export const createRateLimitMiddleware = (
limiter: ReturnType<typeof rateLimit>,
options?: { identifierFn?: (c: Context) => string | undefined },
): MiddlewareHandler => {
return async (c, next) => {
let ip: string;
try {
ip = getIpAddress(c.req.raw);
} catch {
ip = 'unknown';
}
const identifier = options?.identifierFn?.(c);
const result = await limiter.check({ ip, identifier });
c.header('X-RateLimit-Limit', String(result.limit));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Remaining', String(result.remaining));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Reset', String(Math.ceil(result.reset.getTime() / 1000)));
if (result.isLimited) {
c.header('Retry-After', String(Math.ceil((result.reset.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000)));
return c.json({ error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.' }, 429);
}
await next();
};
};
```
### 3.2 Replace existing Hono rate limiters
In `apps/remix/server/router.ts`:
- Remove `hono-rate-limiter` import and both `rateLimiter()` instances
- Replace with `createRateLimitMiddleware()` calls using the defined rate limits
- API routes use IP-only limiting (no identifier)
- AI route uses IP-only limiting with the stricter 3/min limit
```typescript
// Before
import { rateLimiter } from 'hono-rate-limiter';
const rateLimitMiddleware = rateLimiter({ ... });
// After
import { createRateLimitMiddleware } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import { apiV1RateLimit, apiV2RateLimit, aiRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
const apiV1RateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(apiV1RateLimit);
const apiV2RateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(apiV2RateLimit);
const aiRateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(aiRateLimit);
```
### 3.3 Response helpers for inline checks
For auth routes (Hono handlers) and tRPC routes where rate limiting is applied inline rather than via middleware, provide helpers that handle the response formatting and headers consistently.
**Hono helper** — returns a 429 `Response` with headers if limited, or `null` if allowed:
```typescript
export const rateLimitResponse = (c: Context, result: RateLimitCheckResult): Response | null => {
c.header('X-RateLimit-Limit', String(result.limit));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Remaining', String(result.remaining));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Reset', String(Math.ceil(result.reset.getTime() / 1000)));
if (result.isLimited) {
c.header('Retry-After', String(Math.ceil((result.reset.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000)));
return c.json({ error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.' }, 429);
}
return null;
};
```
Usage in auth routes:
```typescript
const result = await loginRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: input.email,
});
const limited = rateLimitResponse(c, result);
if (limited) return limited;
```
**tRPC helper** — throws a `TRPCError` with rate limit headers if limited:
```typescript
export const assertRateLimit = (result: RateLimitCheckResult): void => {
if (result.isLimited) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: 'TOO_MANY_REQUESTS',
});
}
};
```
Usage in tRPC routes:
```typescript
const result = await request2FAEmailRateLimit.check({
ip: ctx.requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: input.recipientId,
});
assertRateLimit(result);
```
Both helpers live in `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware.ts` alongside the Hono middleware.
### 3.4 Auth endpoint rate limiting
In `packages/auth/server/routes/email-password.ts`, add rate limit checks at the start of each handler using the `rateLimitResponse` helper.
Apply to each endpoint per the tier list:
| Endpoint | Rate Limit |
| --------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |
| `POST /signup` | `signupRateLimit` with `identifier: email` |
| `POST /authorize` (login) | `loginRateLimit` with `identifier: email` |
| `POST /forgot-password` | `forgotPasswordRateLimit` with `identifier: email` |
| `POST /resend-verify-email` | `resendVerifyEmailRateLimit` with `identifier: email` |
| `POST /verify-email` | `verifyEmailRateLimit` with `identifier: token` |
| `POST /reset-password` | `resetPasswordRateLimit` with `identifier: token` |
| `POST /passkey/authorize` | `passkeyRateLimit` (IP only, no identifier) |
| `POST /oauth/authorize/*` | `oauthRateLimit` (IP only) |
### 3.4 tRPC unauthenticated route rate limiting
For unauthenticated tRPC routes that send emails, add rate limit checks at the start of the route handler:
| Route | Rate Limit | Identifier |
| ---------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------- |
| `document.accessAuth.request2FAEmail` | `request2FAEmailRateLimit` | `recipientId` or token |
| `enterprise.organisation.authenticationPortal.linkAccount` | `linkOrgAccountRateLimit` | email |
| `template.createDocumentFromDirectTemplate` | Dedicated direct template rate limit | IP only |
Access `requestMetadata` from the tRPC context (`ctx.requestMetadata.ipAddress`).
### 3.5 tRPC and file routes — general API rate limiting
Add rate limit middleware for currently unprotected routes:
- `/api/trpc/*` — apply `apiTrpcRateLimit` middleware
- `/api/files/*` — apply `fileUploadRateLimit` middleware
---
## 4. Cleanup Job
### 4.1 Job definition
Create `packages/lib/jobs/definitions/internal/cleanup-rate-limits.ts`:
```typescript
export const CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION = {
id: 'internal.cleanup-rate-limits',
name: 'Cleanup Rate Limits',
version: '1.0.0',
trigger: {
name: 'internal.cleanup-rate-limits',
schema: z.object({}),
cron: '*/15 * * * *', // Every 15 minutes
},
handler: async ({ payload, io }) => {
const handler = await import('./cleanup-rate-limits.handler');
await handler.run({ payload, io });
},
} as const satisfies JobDefinition<...>;
```
### 4.2 Job handler
Create `packages/lib/jobs/definitions/internal/cleanup-rate-limits.handler.ts`:
- Delete all `RateLimit` rows where `createdAt` is older than 24 hours (covers all possible windows with margin)
- Use batched deletes to avoid long-running transactions
- Batch in chunks of 10,000 rows
```typescript
export const run = async () => {
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
let deleted = 0;
do {
// Prisma doesn't support DELETE with LIMIT, so use raw SQL for batching
deleted = await prisma.$executeRaw`
DELETE FROM "RateLimit"
WHERE "createdAt" < ${cutoff}
AND ctid IN (
SELECT ctid FROM "RateLimit"
WHERE "createdAt" < ${cutoff}
LIMIT 10000
)
`;
} while (deleted > 0);
};
```
### 4.3 Register in job client
Add `CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION` to the job registry in `packages/lib/jobs/client.ts`.
---
## 5. Remove hono-rate-limiter Dependency
After the migration is complete:
- Remove `hono-rate-limiter` from `apps/remix/package.json`
- Run `npm install` to clean up
---
## 6. Files to Create or Modify
### New Files
| File | Purpose |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit.ts` | Core rate limit factory (`rateLimit()`) with window parsing, bucket computation, Prisma upsert, fail-open |
| `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits.ts` | All rate limit instances (auth, API, AI, file upload) |
| `packages/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware.ts` | Hono middleware factory, `rateLimitResponse` helper for Hono handlers, `assertRateLimit` helper for tRPC routes |
| `packages/lib/jobs/definitions/internal/cleanup-rate-limits.ts` | Cleanup cron job definition |
| `packages/lib/jobs/definitions/internal/cleanup-rate-limits.handler.ts` | Cleanup handler (batched deletes) |
### Modified Files
| File | Change |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `packages/prisma/schema.prisma` | Add `RateLimit` model |
| `apps/remix/server/router.ts` | Replace `hono-rate-limiter` with DB-backed middleware, add rate limits for `/api/trpc/*` and `/api/files/*` |
| `apps/remix/package.json` | Remove `hono-rate-limiter` dependency |
| `packages/auth/server/routes/email-password.ts` | Add rate limit checks to signup, login, forgot-password, resend-verify-email, verify-email, reset-password |
| `packages/auth/server/routes/passkey.ts` | Add rate limit check to passkey authorize |
| `packages/auth/server/routes/oauth.ts` | Add rate limit check to OAuth authorize endpoints |
| `packages/trpc/server/document-router/access-auth-request-2fa-email.ts` | Add rate limit check (sends email, unauthenticated) |
| `packages/trpc/server/enterprise-router/link-organisation-account.ts` | Add rate limit check (sends email, unauthenticated) |
| `packages/lib/jobs/client.ts` | Register cleanup-rate-limits job definition |
---
## 7. Considerations
### 7.1 Fail-open
All rate limit checks must be wrapped in try/catch. On any DB error, log the error and allow the request through. Rate limiting should never block legitimate traffic due to infrastructure issues.
### 7.2 Performance
- Each API request adds 1 upsert query (~1ms)
- Auth requests add 2 upsert queries (~2ms total)
- The composite primary key ensures all lookups and upserts are index-only operations
- No `COUNT(*)` queries — the count is stored directly in the row
### 7.3 Monitoring
Log rate limit hits at `warn` level with the action, key type (IP/identifier), and count. This provides visibility into traffic patterns and helps tune limits.
### 7.4 Testing
The rate limit module should be mockable in tests. Consider exporting the bucket computation and window parsing as standalone functions for unit testing. Integration tests can verify the upsert + count logic against a test database.
### 7.5 Future improvements
- **Redis backend**: if DB pressure from rate limiting becomes measurable, swap the Prisma upsert for Redis `INCR` + `EXPIRE` with no API changes
- **System-wide circuit breaker**: add a `systemMax` config option that counts all requests for an action regardless of key
+2
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@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ GOOGLE_VERTEX_API_KEY=""
E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USERNAME="Test User"
E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USER_EMAIL="testuser@mail.com"
E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USER_PASSWORD="test_Password123"
# OPTIONAL: Set to "true" to disable all rate limiting. Only use for E2E tests.
DANGEROUS_BYPASS_RATE_LIMITS=
# [[LOGGER]]
# OPTIONAL: The file to save the logger output to. Will disable stdout if provided.
+1
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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ jobs:
env:
# Needed since we use next start which will set the NODE_ENV to production
NEXT_PRIVATE_SIGNING_LOCAL_FILE_PATH: './example/cert.p12'
DANGEROUS_BYPASS_RATE_LIMITS: 'true'
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: always()
-1
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@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
"content-disposition": "^1.0.1",
"framer-motion": "^12.23.24",
"hono": "4.11.4",
"hono-rate-limiter": "^0.4.2",
"hono-react-router-adapter": "^0.6.5",
"input-otp": "^1.4.2",
"isbot": "^5.1.32",
+31 -47
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@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { rateLimiter } from 'hono-rate-limiter';
import { contextStorage } from 'hono/context-storage';
import { cors } from 'hono/cors';
import { requestId } from 'hono/request-id';
import type { RequestIdVariables } from 'hono/request-id';
import { requestId } from 'hono/request-id';
import type { Logger } from 'pino';
import { tsRestHonoApp } from '@documenso/api/hono';
import { auth } from '@documenso/auth/server';
import { API_V2_BETA_URL, API_V2_URL } from '@documenso/lib/constants/app';
import { jobsClient } from '@documenso/lib/jobs/client';
import { LicenseClient } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/license/license-client';
import { createRateLimitMiddleware } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import {
aiRateLimit,
apiTrpcRateLimit,
apiV1RateLimit,
apiV2RateLimit,
fileUploadRateLimit,
} from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
import { TelemetryClient } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/telemetry/telemetry-client';
import { migrateDeletedAccountServiceAccount } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/service-accounts/deleted-account';
import { migrateLegacyServiceAccount } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/service-accounts/legacy-service-account';
import { getIpAddress } from '@documenso/lib/universal/get-ip-address';
import { env } from '@documenso/lib/utils/env';
import { logger } from '@documenso/lib/utils/logger';
import { openApiDocument } from '@documenso/trpc/server/open-api';
@@ -37,38 +42,13 @@ export interface HonoEnv {
const app = new Hono<HonoEnv>();
/**
* Rate limiting for v1 and v2 API routes only.
* - 100 requests per minute per IP address
* Database-backed rate limiting for API routes.
*/
const rateLimitMiddleware = rateLimiter({
windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute
limit: 100, // 100 requests per window
keyGenerator: (c) => {
try {
return getIpAddress(c.req.raw);
} catch (error) {
return 'unknown';
}
},
message: {
error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',
},
});
const aiRateLimitMiddleware = rateLimiter({
windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute
limit: 3, // 3 requests per window
keyGenerator: (c) => {
try {
return getIpAddress(c.req.raw);
} catch (error) {
return 'unknown';
}
},
message: {
error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',
},
});
const apiV1RateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(apiV1RateLimit);
const apiV2RateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(apiV2RateLimit);
const aiRateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(aiRateLimit);
const trpcRateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(apiTrpcRateLimit);
const fileRateLimitMiddleware = createRateLimitMiddleware(fileUploadRateLimit);
/**
* Attach session and context to requests.
@@ -96,14 +76,20 @@ app.use(async (c, next) => {
await next();
});
// Apply rate limit to /api/v1/*
app.use('/api/v1/*', rateLimitMiddleware);
app.use('/api/v2/*', rateLimitMiddleware);
// Apply cors and rate limits to API routes.
app.use(`/api/v1/*`, cors());
app.use('/api/v1/*', apiV1RateLimitMiddleware);
app.use(`/api/v2/*`, cors());
app.use('/api/v2/*', apiV2RateLimitMiddleware);
app.use(`/api/v2-beta/*`, cors());
app.use('/api/v2-beta/*', apiV2RateLimitMiddleware);
// Auth server.
app.route('/api/auth', auth);
// Files route.
app.use('/api/files/upload-pdf', fileRateLimitMiddleware);
app.use('/api/files/presigned-post-url', fileRateLimitMiddleware);
app.route('/api/files', filesRoute);
// AI route.
@@ -111,28 +97,26 @@ app.use('/api/ai/*', aiRateLimitMiddleware);
app.route('/api/ai', aiRoute);
// API servers.
app.use(`/api/v1/*`, cors());
app.route('/api/v1', tsRestHonoApp);
app.use('/api/jobs/*', jobsClient.getApiHandler());
app.use('/api/trpc/*', trpcRateLimitMiddleware);
app.use('/api/trpc/*', reactRouterTrpcServer);
// Unstable API server routes. Order matters for these two.
app.get(`${API_V2_URL}/openapi.json`, (c) => c.json(openApiDocument));
app.use(`${API_V2_URL}/*`, cors());
app.get(`/api/v2/openapi.json`, (c) => c.json(openApiDocument));
// Shadows the download routes that tRPC defines since tRPC-to-openapi doesn't support their return types.
app.route(`${API_V2_URL}`, downloadRoute);
app.use(`${API_V2_URL}/*`, async (c) =>
app.route(`/api/v2`, downloadRoute);
app.use(`/api/v2/*`, async (c) =>
openApiTrpcServerHandler(c, {
isBeta: false,
}),
);
// Unstable API server routes. Order matters for these two.
app.get(`${API_V2_BETA_URL}/openapi.json`, (c) => c.json(openApiDocument));
app.use(`${API_V2_BETA_URL}/*`, cors());
app.get(`/api/v2-beta/openapi.json`, (c) => c.json(openApiDocument));
// Shadows the download routes that tRPC defines since tRPC-to-openapi doesn't support their return types.
app.route(`${API_V2_BETA_URL}`, downloadRoute);
app.use(`${API_V2_BETA_URL}/*`, async (c) =>
app.route(`/api/v2-beta`, downloadRoute);
app.use(`/api/v2-beta/*`, async (c) =>
openApiTrpcServerHandler(c, {
isBeta: true,
}),
-10
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@@ -143,7 +143,6 @@
"content-disposition": "^1.0.1",
"framer-motion": "^12.23.24",
"hono": "4.11.4",
"hono-rate-limiter": "^0.4.2",
"hono-react-router-adapter": "^0.6.5",
"input-otp": "^1.4.2",
"isbot": "^5.1.32",
@@ -25094,15 +25093,6 @@
"node": ">=16.9.0"
}
},
"node_modules/hono-rate-limiter": {
"version": "0.4.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/hono-rate-limiter/-/hono-rate-limiter-0.4.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-AAtFqgADyrmbDijcRTT/HJfwqfvhalya2Zo+MgfdrMPas3zSMD8SU03cv+ZsYwRU1swv7zgVt0shwN059yzhjw==",
"license": "MIT",
"peerDependencies": {
"hono": "^4.1.1"
}
},
"node_modules/hono-react-router-adapter": {
"version": "0.6.5",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/hono-react-router-adapter/-/hono-react-router-adapter-0.6.5.tgz",
+100 -3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { sValidator } from '@hono/standard-validator';
import { compare } from '@node-rs/bcrypt';
import { UserSecurityAuditLogType } from '@prisma/client';
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { HTTPException } from 'hono/http-exception';
import { DateTime } from 'luxon';
import { z } from 'zod';
@@ -14,6 +15,15 @@ import { isTwoFactorAuthenticationEnabled } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa
import { setupTwoFactorAuthentication } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa/setup-2fa';
import { validateTwoFactorAuthentication } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa/validate-2fa';
import { viewBackupCodes } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa/view-backup-codes';
import { rateLimitResponse } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import {
forgotPasswordRateLimit,
loginRateLimit,
resendVerifyEmailRateLimit,
resetPasswordRateLimit,
signupRateLimit,
verifyEmailRateLimit,
} from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
import { createUser } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/create-user';
import { forgotPassword } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/forgot-password';
import { getMostRecentEmailVerificationToken } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/get-most-recent-email-verification-token';
@@ -51,6 +61,19 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
const { email, password, totpCode, backupCode, csrfToken } = c.req.valid('json');
const loginLimitResult = await loginRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: email,
});
const loginLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, loginLimitResult);
if (loginLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: loginLimited,
});
}
const csrfCookieToken = await getCsrfCookie(c);
// Todo: (RR7) Add logging here.
@@ -152,6 +175,8 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
* Signup endpoint.
*/
.post('/signup', sValidator('json', ZSignUpSchema), async (c) => {
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
if (env('NEXT_PUBLIC_DISABLE_SIGNUP') === 'true') {
throw new AppError('SIGNUP_DISABLED', {
message: 'Signups are disabled.',
@@ -160,6 +185,18 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
const { name, email, password, signature } = c.req.valid('json');
const signupLimitResult = await signupRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
});
const signupLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, signupLimitResult);
if (signupLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: signupLimited,
});
}
const user = await createUser({ name, email, password, signature }).catch((err) => {
console.error(err);
throw err;
@@ -219,7 +256,24 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
* Verify email endpoint.
*/
.post('/verify-email', sValidator('json', ZVerifyEmailSchema), async (c) => {
const { state, userId } = await verifyEmail({ token: c.req.valid('json').token });
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const { token } = c.req.valid('json');
const verifyLimitResult = await verifyEmailRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: token,
});
const verifyLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, verifyLimitResult);
if (verifyLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: verifyLimited,
});
}
const { state, userId } = await verifyEmail({ token });
// If email is verified, automatically authenticate user.
if (state === EMAIL_VERIFICATION_STATE.VERIFIED && userId !== null) {
@@ -234,8 +288,23 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
* Resend verification email endpoint.
*/
.post('/resend-verify-email', sValidator('json', ZResendVerifyEmailSchema), async (c) => {
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const { email } = c.req.valid('json');
const resendLimitResult = await resendVerifyEmailRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: email,
});
const resendLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, resendLimitResult);
if (resendLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: resendLimited,
});
}
await jobsClient.triggerJob({
name: 'send.signup.confirmation.email',
payload: {
@@ -249,8 +318,23 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
* Forgot password endpoint.
*/
.post('/forgot-password', sValidator('json', ZForgotPasswordSchema), async (c) => {
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const { email } = c.req.valid('json');
const forgotLimitResult = await forgotPasswordRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: email,
});
const forgotLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, forgotLimitResult);
if (forgotLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: forgotLimited,
});
}
if (
email.toLowerCase() === legacyServiceAccountEmail() ||
email.toLowerCase() === deletedServiceAccountEmail()
@@ -268,8 +352,23 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
* Reset password endpoint.
*/
.post('/reset-password', sValidator('json', ZResetPasswordSchema), async (c) => {
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const { token, password } = c.req.valid('json');
const resetLimitResult = await resetPasswordRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: token,
});
const resetLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, resetLimitResult);
if (resetLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: resetLimited,
});
}
const user = await getUserByResetToken({ token });
if (
@@ -279,8 +378,6 @@ export const emailPasswordRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
return c.text('FORBIDDEN', 403);
}
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const { userId } = await resetPassword({
token,
password,
+15
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ import { UserSecurityAuditLogType } from '@prisma/client';
import { verifyAuthenticationResponse } from '@simplewebauthn/server';
import { isoBase64URL } from '@simplewebauthn/server/helpers';
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { HTTPException } from 'hono/http-exception';
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '@documenso/lib/errors/app-error';
import { rateLimitResponse } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import { passkeyRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
import { deletedServiceAccountEmail } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/service-accounts/deleted-account';
import { legacyServiceAccountEmail } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/user/service-accounts/legacy-service-account';
import type { TAuthenticationResponseJSONSchema } from '@documenso/lib/types/webauthn';
@@ -23,6 +26,18 @@ export const passkeyRoute = new Hono<HonoAuthContext>()
.post('/authorize', sValidator('json', ZPasskeyAuthorizeSchema), async (c) => {
const requestMetadata = c.get('requestMetadata');
const passkeyLimitResult = await passkeyRateLimit.check({
ip: requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
});
const passkeyLimited = rateLimitResponse(c, passkeyLimitResult);
if (passkeyLimited) {
throw new HTTPException(429, {
res: passkeyLimited,
});
}
const { csrfToken, credential } = c.req.valid('json');
if (typeof csrfToken !== 'string' || csrfToken.length === 0) {
+8
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ type AppErrorOptions = {
* Mainly used for API -> Frontend communication and logging filtering.
*/
statusCode?: number;
/**
* Optional headers to include when this error is returned in an API response.
*/
headers?: Record<string, string>;
};
export class AppError extends Error {
@@ -82,6 +87,8 @@ export class AppError extends Error {
*/
statusCode?: number;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
name = 'AppError';
/**
@@ -97,6 +104,7 @@ export class AppError extends Error {
this.code = errorCode;
this.userMessage = options?.userMessage;
this.statusCode = options?.statusCode;
this.headers = options?.headers;
}
/**
+2
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { SEND_SIGNING_EMAIL_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/emails/send-sig
import { SEND_TEAM_DELETED_EMAIL_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/emails/send-team-deleted-email';
import { BACKPORT_SUBSCRIPTION_CLAIM_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/backport-subscription-claims';
import { BULK_SEND_TEMPLATE_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/bulk-send-template';
import { CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/cleanup-rate-limits';
import { EXECUTE_WEBHOOK_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/execute-webhook';
import { EXPIRE_RECIPIENTS_SWEEP_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/expire-recipients-sweep';
import { PROCESS_RECIPIENT_EXPIRED_JOB_DEFINITION } from './definitions/internal/process-recipient-expired';
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ export const jobsClient = new JobClient([
EXECUTE_WEBHOOK_JOB_DEFINITION,
EXPIRE_RECIPIENTS_SWEEP_JOB_DEFINITION,
PROCESS_RECIPIENT_EXPIRED_JOB_DEFINITION,
CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION,
] as const);
export const jobs = jobsClient;
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
import { DateTime } from 'luxon';
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
import type { JobRunIO } from '../../client/_internal/job';
import type { TCleanupRateLimitsJobDefinition } from './cleanup-rate-limits';
const BATCH_SIZE = 10_000;
export const run = async ({ io }: { payload: TCleanupRateLimitsJobDefinition; io: JobRunIO }) => {
const cutoff = DateTime.now().minus({ hours: 24 }).toJSDate();
let totalDeleted = 0;
let deleted = 0;
do {
// Prisma doesn't support DELETE with LIMIT, so use raw SQL for batching
// to avoid long-running transactions that could lock the table.
deleted = await prisma.$executeRaw`
DELETE FROM "RateLimit"
WHERE ctid IN (
SELECT ctid FROM "RateLimit"
WHERE "createdAt" < ${cutoff}
LIMIT ${BATCH_SIZE}
)
`;
totalDeleted += deleted;
} while (deleted >= BATCH_SIZE);
if (totalDeleted > 0) {
io.logger.info(`Cleaned up ${totalDeleted} expired rate limit entries`);
} else {
io.logger.info('No expired rate limit entries to clean up');
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
import { type JobDefinition } from '../../client/_internal/job';
const CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_ID = 'internal.cleanup-rate-limits';
const CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_SCHEMA = z.object({});
export type TCleanupRateLimitsJobDefinition = z.infer<
typeof CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_SCHEMA
>;
export const CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION = {
id: CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_ID,
name: 'Cleanup Rate Limits',
version: '1.0.0',
trigger: {
name: CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_ID,
schema: CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_SCHEMA,
cron: '*/15 * * * *', // Every 15 minutes.
},
handler: async ({ payload, io }) => {
const handler = await import('./cleanup-rate-limits.handler');
await handler.run({ payload, io });
},
} as const satisfies JobDefinition<
typeof CLEANUP_RATE_LIMITS_JOB_DEFINITION_ID,
TCleanupRateLimitsJobDefinition
>;
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
import type { Context } from 'hono';
import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono/types';
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '../../errors/app-error';
import { getIpAddress } from '../../universal/get-ip-address';
import type { RateLimitCheckResult } from './rate-limit';
import type { createRateLimit } from './rate-limit';
/**
* Set rate limit response headers on a Hono context.
*/
const setRateLimitHeaders = (c: Context, result: RateLimitCheckResult) => {
c.header('X-RateLimit-Limit', String(result.limit));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Remaining', String(result.remaining));
c.header('X-RateLimit-Reset', String(Math.ceil(result.reset.getTime() / 1000)));
};
/**
* Create a Hono middleware that applies rate limiting to a route.
*
* Uses IP address for identification. Optionally accepts an identifier
* function for per-user/per-entity limiting.
*/
export const createRateLimitMiddleware = (
limiter: ReturnType<typeof createRateLimit>,
options?: { identifierFn?: (c: Context) => string | undefined },
): MiddlewareHandler => {
return async (c, next) => {
let ip: string;
try {
ip = getIpAddress(c.req.raw);
} catch {
ip = 'unknown';
}
const identifier = options?.identifierFn?.(c);
const result = await limiter.check({ ip, identifier });
setRateLimitHeaders(c, result);
if (result.isLimited) {
c.header(
'Retry-After',
String(Math.max(1, Math.ceil((result.reset.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000))),
);
return c.json({ error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.' }, 429);
}
await next();
};
};
/**
* Helper for inline rate limit checks in Hono auth routes.
*
* Returns a 429 Response with rate limit headers if limited, or `null` if allowed.
*/
export const rateLimitResponse = (c: Context, result: RateLimitCheckResult): Response | null => {
setRateLimitHeaders(c, result);
if (result.isLimited) {
c.header(
'Retry-After',
String(Math.max(1, Math.ceil((result.reset.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000))),
);
return c.json({ error: 'Too many requests, please try again later.' }, 429);
}
return null;
};
/**
* Helper for inline rate limit checks in tRPC routes.
*
* Throws an AppError with TOO_MANY_REQUESTS code if limited.
*/
export const assertRateLimit = (result: RateLimitCheckResult): void => {
if (result.isLimited) {
const retryAfter = String(Math.max(1, Math.ceil((result.reset.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000)));
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, {
message: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',
headers: {
'X-RateLimit-Limit': String(result.limit),
'X-RateLimit-Remaining': String(result.remaining),
'X-RateLimit-Reset': String(Math.ceil(result.reset.getTime() / 1000)),
'Retry-After': retryAfter,
},
});
}
};
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
import { logger } from '../../utils/logger';
type WindowUnit = 's' | 'm' | 'h' | 'd';
type WindowStr = `${number}${WindowUnit}`;
type RateLimitConfig = {
action: string;
max: number;
globalMax?: number;
window: WindowStr;
};
type CheckParams = {
ip: string;
identifier?: string;
};
export type RateLimitCheckResult = {
isLimited: boolean;
remaining: number;
limit: number;
reset: Date;
};
/**
* Parse window string (e.g., '1h', '15m', '30s') to milliseconds.
*/
export const parseWindow = (window: WindowStr): number => {
const value = parseInt(window.slice(0, -1), 10);
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/consistent-type-assertions
const unit = window.slice(-1) as WindowUnit;
const multipliers: Record<WindowUnit, number> = {
s: 1000,
m: 60 * 1000,
h: 60 * 60 * 1000,
d: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
};
return value * multipliers[unit];
};
/**
* Compute the current time bucket for the given window size.
*/
export const getBucket = (windowMs: number): Date => {
const now = Date.now();
return new Date(now - (now % windowMs));
};
/**
* Create a rate limiter with the given configuration.
*
* Uses bucketed counters in the database for distributed rate limiting
* across multiple instances. Each check atomically increments the counter
* and returns the new count.
*/
export const createRateLimit = (config: RateLimitConfig) => {
const windowMs = parseWindow(config.window);
return {
async check(params: CheckParams): Promise<RateLimitCheckResult> {
const bucket = getBucket(windowMs);
const reset = new Date(bucket.getTime() + windowMs);
const ipLimit = config.globalMax ?? config.max;
if (process.env.DANGEROUS_BYPASS_RATE_LIMITS === 'true') {
return {
isLimited: false,
remaining: ipLimit,
limit: ipLimit,
reset,
};
}
try {
// Always upsert the IP counter.
const ipResult = await prisma.rateLimit.upsert({
where: {
key_action_bucket: {
key: `ip:${params.ip}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
},
},
create: {
key: `ip:${params.ip}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
count: 1,
},
update: {
count: { increment: 1 },
},
});
// Check IP against globalMax if set, or against max if no identifier is provided.
let ipCheckLimit = config.globalMax;
if (!params.identifier) {
ipCheckLimit = config.max;
}
if (ipCheckLimit && ipResult.count > ipCheckLimit) {
logger.warn({
msg: 'Rate limit exceeded',
action: config.action,
keyType: 'ip',
key: params.ip,
count: ipResult.count,
limit: ipCheckLimit,
});
return {
isLimited: true,
remaining: 0,
limit: ipCheckLimit,
reset,
};
}
// Upsert the identifier counter if provided.
if (params.identifier) {
const identifierResult = await prisma.rateLimit.upsert({
where: {
key_action_bucket: {
key: `id:${params.identifier}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
},
},
create: {
key: `id:${params.identifier}`,
action: config.action,
bucket,
count: 1,
},
update: {
count: { increment: 1 },
},
});
if (identifierResult.count > config.max) {
logger.warn({
msg: 'Rate limit exceeded',
action: config.action,
keyType: 'identifier',
key: params.identifier,
count: identifierResult.count,
limit: config.max,
});
return {
isLimited: true,
remaining: 0,
limit: config.max,
reset,
};
}
return {
isLimited: false,
remaining: Math.max(0, config.max - identifierResult.count),
limit: config.max,
reset,
};
}
return {
isLimited: false,
remaining: Math.max(0, ipLimit - ipResult.count),
limit: ipLimit,
reset,
};
} catch (error) {
// Fail-open: if the rate limit DB query fails, allow the request through.
logger.error({
msg: 'Rate limit check failed, failing open',
action: config.action,
error,
});
const limit = params.identifier ? config.max : ipLimit;
return {
isLimited: false,
remaining: limit,
limit,
reset,
};
}
},
};
};
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
import { createRateLimit } from './rate-limit';
// ---- Auth (Tier 1 - Critical, sends emails) ----
export const signupRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.signup',
max: 10,
window: '1h',
});
export const forgotPasswordRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.forgot-password',
max: 3,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const resendVerifyEmailRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.resend-verify-email',
max: 3,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const request2FAEmailRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.request-2fa-email',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '15m',
});
// ---- Auth (Tier 2 - Unauthenticated) ----
export const loginRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.login',
max: 10,
globalMax: 50,
window: '15m',
});
export const resetPasswordRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.reset-password',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
export const verifyEmailRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.verify-email',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '15m',
});
export const passkeyRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.passkey',
max: 10,
globalMax: 50,
window: '15m',
});
export const linkOrgAccountRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'auth.link-org-account',
max: 5,
globalMax: 20,
window: '1h',
});
// ---- API (Tier 4 - Standard) ----
export const apiV1RateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'api.v1',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const apiV2RateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'api.v2',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const apiTrpcRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'api.trpc',
max: 100,
window: '1m',
});
export const aiRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'api.ai',
max: 3,
window: '1m',
});
export const fileUploadRateLimit = createRateLimit({
action: 'api.file-upload',
max: 20,
window: '1m',
});
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
-- CreateTable
CREATE TABLE "RateLimit" (
"key" TEXT NOT NULL,
"action" TEXT NOT NULL,
"bucket" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
"count" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
CONSTRAINT "RateLimit_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("key","action","bucket")
);
-- CreateIndex
CREATE INDEX "RateLimit_createdAt_idx" ON "RateLimit"("createdAt");
+12
View File
@@ -1086,3 +1086,15 @@ model Counter {
id String @id
value Int
}
model RateLimit {
key String
action String
bucket DateTime
count Int @default(1)
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
@@id([key, action, bucket])
@@index([createdAt])
}
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import { DateTime } from 'luxon';
import { TWO_FACTOR_EMAIL_EXPIRATION_MINUTES } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa/email/constants';
import { send2FATokenEmail } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/2fa/email/send-2fa-token-email';
import { assertRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import { request2FAEmailRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
import { DocumentAuth } from '@documenso/lib/types/document-auth';
import { extractDocumentAuthMethods } from '@documenso/lib/utils/document-auth';
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
@@ -21,6 +23,13 @@ export const accessAuthRequest2FAEmailRoute = procedure
try {
const { token } = input;
const rateLimitResult = await request2FAEmailRateLimit.check({
ip: ctx.metadata.requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: token,
});
assertRateLimit(rateLimitResult);
const user = ctx.user;
// Get document and recipient by token
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
import { linkOrganisationAccount } from '@documenso/ee/server-only/lib/link-organisation-account';
import { assertRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limit-middleware';
import { linkOrgAccountRateLimit } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/rate-limit/rate-limits';
import { procedure } from '../trpc';
import {
@@ -15,6 +17,13 @@ export const linkOrganisationAccountRoute = procedure
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
const { token } = input;
const rateLimitResult = await linkOrgAccountRateLimit.check({
ip: ctx.metadata.requestMetadata.ipAddress ?? 'unknown',
identifier: token,
});
assertRateLimit(rateLimitResult);
await linkOrganisationAccount({
token,
requestMeta: ctx.metadata.requestMetadata,
+7 -1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ const t = initTRPC
.create({
transformer: dataTransformer,
errorFormatter(opts) {
const { shape, error } = opts;
const { shape, error, ctx } = opts;
const originalError = error.cause;
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ const t = initTRPC
// Default unknown errors to 400, since if you're throwing an AppError it is expected
// that you already know what you're doing.
if (originalError instanceof AppError) {
if (originalError.headers && ctx) {
for (const [headerKey, headerValue] of Object.entries(originalError.headers)) {
ctx.res.headers.append(headerKey, headerValue);
}
}
data = {
...data,
appError: AppError.toJSON(originalError),
+1
View File
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
"E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USERNAME",
"E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USER_EMAIL",
"E2E_TEST_AUTHENTICATE_USER_PASSWORD",
"DANGEROUS_BYPASS_RATE_LIMITS",
"NEXT_PUBLIC_USE_INTERNAL_URL_BROWSERLESS",
"NEXT_PRIVATE_OIDC_PROMPT"
]