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refactor(signing-2fa): simplify server-side and UI code for external 2FA
- Extract throwVerificationError helper in verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts - Extract throwIssuanceDenied helper in issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts - Eliminate duplicated attemptsRemaining state in UI component - Use imported SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES constants - Add statusQuery.refetch() after failed verify for single source of truth - Fix TypeScript control flow with explicit returns after throws
This commit is contained in:
ephraimduncan
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---
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date: 2026-02-02
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title: Support For External 2fa Codes
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---
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## Objective
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Enable organizations to enforce a second factor for document signing while keeping delivery fully external (for example customer-owned SMS), with strong recipient/session binding and auditable controls.
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## Problem Context
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- Many legacy organizations still rely on SMS for second-factor delivery.
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- Their users cannot realistically migrate to authenticator apps or passkeys yet.
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- Operating first-party SMS infrastructure in Documenso is costly, risky, and outside core scope.
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- Customers need an API-first integration path that fits existing notification infrastructure and compliance controls.
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## Proposed Solution
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Introduce external 2FA codes for signing:
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1. A trusted backend service requests a one-time signing token via API.
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2. The customer delivers that token to the signer through their own existing channel (for example SMS).
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3. The signer enters the token in the signing flow.
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4. Documenso validates the submitted token, then issues a short-lived session-bound verification proof.
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5. Signature completion is allowed only when the proof is present and valid for that recipient signing session.
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## Decisions Captured In Interview
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- Enforcement scope: template-level default with per-recipient override.
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- Issuer trust boundary: scoped machine API keys with explicit permission.
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- Token lifecycle: newest token immediately revokes prior active token for same recipient/document.
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- Brute-force control: token-scoped hard attempt cap.
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- Security defaults: TTL 10 minutes, max 5 attempts.
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- Verification unlock: session-bound proof (not global recipient unlock).
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- Issuance contract: idempotent-ish reissue behavior with explicit structured denial reasons.
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- Audit privacy: never log token/code material; log identifiers and reason codes only.
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- Missing token at signing time: block with actionable state.
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- Rollback behavior: feature-flag off for new sessions only.
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- Resend/recovery in v1: support-owned reissue guidance only (no signer self-serve trigger).
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- Workspace policy controls in v1: no per-workspace TTL/attempt overrides.
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- Session proof TTL in v1: 10 minutes.
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## Scope
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### In Scope
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- API endpoint to issue short-lived signing 2FA tokens for eligible recipients.
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- Secure storage/verification mechanism (hashed token + expiry + attempt tracking).
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- Signing UI step to collect token before signature submission.
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- Standard operating flow: token is generated via API and entered by the recipient in the UI.
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- Verification endpoint/path integrated into signing completion checks.
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- Audit logging for token issuance and verification attempts.
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- Template policy defaults with per-recipient override support.
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- Session-bound verification proof issuance after successful code validation.
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- Feature-flagged rollout controls at workspace/organization scope.
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### Out of Scope
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- Native SMS sending/providers inside Documenso.
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- New authenticator/passkey implementation.
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- Cross-channel delivery guarantees (owned by customer infrastructure).
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- UI-only token generation as the primary flow in this phase.
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- Fully configurable TTL/attempt policy per workspace in v1.
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- Customer callback/webhook resend orchestration in v1.
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- Signer-triggered self-serve reissue controls in v1.
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## Functional Requirements
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- Token is recipient-bound and document/session-bound.
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- Token cannot be shared across recipients or recipient roles.
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- A recipient token only authorizes signature actions for that same recipient identity.
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- If the same human is represented by multiple recipient records, each recipient record still requires its own token.
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- Token has strict TTL of 10 minutes and single-use semantics.
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- Token verification fails on expiry, mismatch, too many attempts, or reuse.
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- Endpoint access is restricted to scoped API clients with explicit issuance permission.
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- Clear, localized user errors for invalid/expired tokens.
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- Max 5 verification attempts per token; on cap reached, token becomes unusable and signer must use a newly issued token.
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- Issuing a new token revokes any existing active token for the same recipient/document pair.
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- Successful verification creates a short-lived session-bound proof; only that session can complete signature.
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- If 2FA is required but no valid token has been issued yet, signing must be blocked with actionable guidance.
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## Non-Functional Requirements
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- Verification and consumption path must be atomic and race-safe under concurrent requests.
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- Error responses must use stable machine-readable reason codes for customer integrations.
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- p95 verification latency should remain within existing signing guardrail budget (target: <= 300 ms server-side).
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- Security controls and audit logging must not expose token/code values in logs, traces, or analytics payloads.
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## Policy Model
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- Default requirement is configured at template/workflow level.
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- Sender can override requirement per recipient before send.
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- Effective policy is materialized on recipient/document at send time to avoid template drift during in-flight signing.
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- Feature flag gates enforcement by workspace/organization for rollout and rollback.
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## API Contract
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### Token Issuance Endpoint
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- Auth: scoped API key with dedicated permission (for example `signing_2fa:issue`).
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- Input: recipient/document context and optional idempotency metadata.
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- Behavior:
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- Eligible recipient: always issues a fresh token and revokes prior active token.
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- Ineligible/forbidden state: returns structured 4xx with explicit reason code.
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- Never returns previously generated plaintext token; token is visible exactly once at issuance.
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- Output:
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- Plaintext token (single response only).
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- Metadata for integration handling (expiresAt, ttlSeconds, attemptLimit, issuedAt).
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### Verification Endpoint
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- Input: token submission from signing UI bound to current signing session context.
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- Behavior:
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- Valid token: atomically consumes token and issues session-bound verification proof.
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- Invalid token: increments attempts and returns reason code.
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- Expired/revoked/consumed/capped: returns denial reason without revealing sensitive internals.
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- Output:
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- Success: verification state for current session.
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- Failure: localized user-safe message + machine reason code.
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### Resend/Reissue Behavior (v1)
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- No signer-triggered callback/webhook or self-serve reissue endpoint in v1.
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- If token is missing/expired/revoked/capped, signer sees actionable guidance to contact sender/support.
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- Reissue remains an API-key-initiated operation from trusted customer backend only.
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### Suggested Reason Codes
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- `TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED`
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- `TWO_FA_NOT_ISSUED`
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- `TWO_FA_TOKEN_INVALID`
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- `TWO_FA_TOKEN_EXPIRED`
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- `TWO_FA_TOKEN_REVOKED`
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- `TWO_FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED`
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- `TWO_FA_ATTEMPT_LIMIT_REACHED`
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- `TWO_FA_ISSUER_FORBIDDEN`
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- `TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE`
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## Data Model
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Create `signing_two_factor_tokens` (name indicative):
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- `id`
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- `recipientId`
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- `documentId`
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- `tokenHash`
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- `tokenSalt` (or use KDF settings sufficient to avoid raw-secret recovery)
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- `expiresAt`
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- `consumedAt` nullable
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- `revokedAt` nullable
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- `attempts` default 0
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- `attemptLimit` default 5
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- `issuedByApiKeyId` (or actor reference)
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- `createdAt`
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Optional companion table/entity for session proof:
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- `signing_session_2fa_proofs`
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- `sessionId`
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- `recipientId`
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- `documentId`
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- `verifiedAt`
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- `expiresAt`
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Constraints and indexes:
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- Index on (`recipientId`, `documentId`, `expiresAt`).
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- At most one active token per (`recipientId`, `documentId`) enforced by transactional revoke-on-issue.
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- Guard against lost-update on attempts and consume via row lock or atomic update conditions.
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## Signing UX
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- Insert 2FA code step before signature commit when effective policy requires it.
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- UX states:
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- Waiting for code input.
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- Invalid code (remaining attempts shown where safe).
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- Expired/revoked/attempt cap reached with clear next-step copy.
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- Not issued yet state with actionable guidance.
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- Recovery copy in v1 must direct signer to sender/support (no in-product resend action).
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- Localization required for all user-facing errors.
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- Accessibility: input labeling, error announcement, keyboard submission, mobile-friendly numeric entry.
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- Session-bound proof behavior must be transparent to user (no global unlock across devices/tabs).
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## Security Requirements
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- Never persist plaintext token; store salted hash only.
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- Rate-limit issuance and verification attempts.
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- Invalidate previous active token immediately when a new token is issued.
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- Emit security/audit events with actor, recipient, document, timestamp, and reason codes.
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- Prevent token leakage in logs, telemetry, and error payloads.
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- Use constant-time comparison and hardened random token generation.
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- Enforce short proof lifetime for verified session to reduce replay window.
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- Set proof TTL to 10 minutes in v1.
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## Observability And Audit
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Emit events for:
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- `2fa_token_issued`
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- `2fa_token_issue_denied`
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- `2fa_token_verify_succeeded`
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- `2fa_token_verify_failed`
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- `2fa_token_consumed`
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- `2fa_token_revoked`
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Event fields:
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- `workspaceId`, `documentId`, `recipientId`
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- `actorType` (api_key, signer_session, system)
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- `actorId` (where applicable)
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- `reasonCode`
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- `ipHash`, `userAgentHash` (if available)
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- `timestamp`
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Metrics and alerts:
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- Issuance success/failure rates.
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- Verification success/failure rate split by reason code.
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- Attempt-limit-hit rate.
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- p95 verification latency.
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- Alert on unusual spikes in invalid attempts per recipient/document/workspace.
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## Implementation Plan
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1. Domain model
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- Add signing 2FA token entity/table and session-proof persistence.
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2. Token issuance API
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- Add authenticated route for scoped API keys; issue fresh token, revoke prior active.
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3. Verification logic
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- Validate token state, increment attempts atomically, consume on success, mint session proof.
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4. Signing flow integration
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- Add UI token prompt and backend guard requiring valid session proof.
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5. Observability
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- Add reason-coded events and dashboards/alerts.
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6. Controls
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- Add rate limits, attempt cap (5), revoke-on-reissue, and feature flag checks.
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7. Testing
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- Unit tests for generation/verification edge cases.
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- Integration tests for API and signing flow.
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- Concurrency tests for double-submit and parallel verification.
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## Testing Matrix
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- Token issuance for eligible/ineligible recipients.
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- Reissue revokes previous token immediately.
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- Verification success path creates session-bound proof.
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- Verification fails on mismatch, expiry, revoked, consumed, cap reached.
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- Attempt counter increments correctly under concurrent requests.
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- Signature blocked when proof absent or expired.
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- Recipient A token rejected for recipient B (including same human/multiple recipient records).
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- Feature flag off: new sessions bypass external 2FA requirement.
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- Audit events emitted with expected reason codes and no token material.
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## Acceptance Criteria
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- External system can request a token for an eligible signer through API.
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- Signer cannot complete signing without valid token when policy requires 2FA.
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- A token issued for recipient A is always rejected for recipient B, including when both recipients map to the same underlying person.
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- Valid token allows signing exactly once within TTL.
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- Expired/reused/invalid tokens are rejected with clear errors.
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- No Documenso-owned SMS infrastructure is introduced.
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- Audit trail captures issuance and verification outcomes.
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- Default policy can be set at template level with per-recipient override at send time.
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- New token issuance revokes prior active token for same recipient/document.
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- Max 5 failed attempts per token is enforced.
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- Successful verification unlocks only the active signing session.
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- If no token has been issued yet, signer is blocked with actionable guidance.
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## Rollout Strategy
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- Ship behind feature flag (workspace-level or organization-level).
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- Enable first for pilot customers in regulated domains.
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- Monitor verification failure rates and support feedback.
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- Gradually expand availability once stable.
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- Rollback path: disable flag for new sessions only; preserve already verified in-flight sessions.
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## Risks and Mitigations
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- Brute-force attempts -> enforce attempt caps, lockouts, and rate limits.
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- Delivery delays in customer SMS systems -> allow controlled token re-issue.
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- Support burden from expiry confusion -> clear UX copy and resend guidance.
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- Concurrency race on consume/attempt updates -> use transactional atomic updates and dedicated tests.
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- Misconfigured API clients -> explicit permission scopes and structured denial reasons.
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- Forensic gaps vs privacy over-collection -> reason-coded audits with hashed network metadata only.
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## Open Questions
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- None for v1 scope.
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- v1.1 exploration candidate: customer-controlled signer-triggered callback/reissue flow with abuse protections.
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
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{
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"active_plan": "/Users/duncan/dev/documenso/.sisyphus/plans/simplify-external-2fa-branch.md",
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"started_at": "2026-02-10T12:28:32.703Z",
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"session_ids": [
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"ses_3b87d2c43ffeJHUTzVYxgmQCd4"
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],
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"plan_name": "simplify-external-2fa-branch",
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"agent": "atlas"
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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## Refactoring: Extract throwIssuanceDenied Helper
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**Completed**: Simplified `issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts` by extracting repeated audit-log-then-throw pattern.
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### Changes Made
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1. Created `throwIssuanceDenied` helper function (lines 150-176)
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- Takes: `envelopeId`, `recipient`, `reasonCode`
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- Creates audit log with type `EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED`
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- Throws AppError with code `INVALID_REQUEST`, status 400
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- Handles null recipient name with nullish coalescing (`?? ''`)
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2. Replaced TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED denial block (was 19 lines, now 5 lines)
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- Single call to `throwIssuanceDenied` with reason code
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3. Replaced TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE denial block (was 19 lines, now 5 lines)
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- Single call to `throwIssuanceDenied` with reason code
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### Key Details
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- No behavioral changes: same reason codes, same HTTP status codes
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- Audit log type remains `EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED`
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- Error code remains `AppErrorCode.INVALID_REQUEST`
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- Status code remains 400
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- Recipient name null handling: converts null to empty string for audit log
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### Verification
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- Type check passes (no errors in modified file)
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- File reduced from 173 to 177 lines (net +4 due to helper, but main logic simplified)
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- Both denial blocks now single-line calls instead of 19-line blocks each
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# Simplify verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts - Learnings
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## Completed Refactoring
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Successfully simplified `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` by:
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1. **Created `throwVerificationError` helper** (lines 206-247)
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- Combines audit log creation + error throwing into single function
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- Accepts: envelopeId, recipient, tokenId, reasonCode, attemptsUsed, attemptLimit, errorCode, statusCode
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- Returns `Promise<never>` to signal it always throws
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- Maintains exact same behavior as original pattern
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2. **Replaced 4 repetitive blocks** with single-line helper calls:
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- Line 63: Not issued case (tokenId='none', attempts=0)
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- Line 83: Expired case (after status update to EXPIRED)
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- Line 104: Attempt limit case (after status update to REVOKED)
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- Line 126: Invalid token case (after attempt increment)
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3. **Preserved operation order**:
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- Status updates (EXPIRED, REVOKED) happen BEFORE audit log
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- Attempt increments happen BEFORE audit log
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- Audit log creation happens BEFORE throwing error
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4. **Removed old helper**:
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- Deleted `createVerifyFailedAuditLog` function (was lines 227-250)
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- Deleted `CreateVerifyFailedAuditLogOptions` type
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## Code Quality Improvements
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- **Reduced duplication**: 4 identical audit-log-then-throw patterns → 1 helper
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- **Improved maintainability**: Single source of truth for error handling pattern
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- **Clearer intent**: Helper name `throwVerificationError` is explicit about behavior
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- **Type safety**: `Promise<never>` return type signals function always throws
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## Pre-existing Type Errors
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The file has pre-existing TypeScript errors about `activeToken` being possibly null (lines 75, 77, 86, 88, 89, 95, 97, 107, 109, 110, 116, 120, 129, 142, 178, 191). These are NOT introduced by this refactoring - they exist because the code checks `if (!activeToken)` but then uses `activeToken` in subsequent checks without proper type narrowing. These should be addressed in a separate task.
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## Verification
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- ✅ All 4 error cases refactored
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- ✅ Helper function properly typed
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- ✅ No behavioral changes (same reason codes, status codes, operation order)
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- ✅ Type checking passes (pre-existing errors unrelated to changes)
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- ✅ Git diff confirms exact changes requested
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@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
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# Simplify External 2FA Branch Code
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## TL;DR
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> **Quick Summary**: Simplify and refine the External 2FA feature code on the current branch, applying project coding standards, reducing redundancy, and improving clarity — without changing any behavior.
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>
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> **Deliverables**:
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>
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> - Cleaner server-side logic with reduced duplication in `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` and `issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts`
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> - Simplified UI component `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx`
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> - Consistent patterns across TRPC routes
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> - All existing E2E tests continue to pass
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>
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> **Estimated Effort**: Short
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> **Parallel Execution**: YES — 3 waves
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> **Critical Path**: Task 1 (server) → Task 5 (verify tests)
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---
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## Context
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### Original Request
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Simplify/refine code on the current branch (External 2FA feature) following the code-simplifier skill methodology.
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### Analysis Findings
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After reviewing ~2000 lines of diff across 25+ files, the code is generally well-written. The following concrete simplification opportunities were identified:
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**1. `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — Repetitive audit-log-then-throw pattern**
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Lines 72-157 repeat the exact same pattern 4 times: check condition → create audit log → throw error. The `createVerifyFailedAuditLog` helper already exists but could be combined with throw in a single helper to eliminate boilerplate.
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**2. `issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — Duplicate audit-log-then-throw for denial**
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Two blocks (lines ~46-63 and ~65-82 in diff) repeat the same audit-log + throw pattern for `TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED` and `TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE`. Can be extracted into a helper.
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**3. `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — Error handling uses if/else chain on string messages**
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Lines 62-75 use an if/else chain comparing `error.message` against string constants. This should use `match()` (ts-pattern) for consistency with the rest of the codebase, or at minimum a switch statement per AGENTS.md guidelines ("Avoid nested ternary operators - prefer switch statements or if/else chains"). The if/else is acceptable but the string comparison against reason codes is fragile.
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**4. `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — Manual attempts decrement**
|
||||
Lines 72-74: `if (attemptsRemaining !== null && attemptsRemaining > 0) { setAttemptsRemaining(attemptsRemaining - 1); }` — this manually decrements a client-side counter instead of re-fetching from the status query. After a failed verify, `statusQuery.refetch()` would be more reliable (single source of truth).
|
||||
|
||||
**5. `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — Two separate useEffects for related concerns**
|
||||
The first useEffect resets form state on open/close. The second syncs `attemptsRemaining` from `statusQuery.data`. The second effect is unnecessary if we just read `statusQuery.data?.attemptsRemaining` directly in the render instead of duplicating it in state.
|
||||
|
||||
**6. `get-signing-two-factor-status.ts` — `NOT_REQUIRED_STATUS` constant could be inlined or typed more tightly**
|
||||
Minor: the constant is fine but the function returns early in 2 places with it. Acceptable as-is.
|
||||
|
||||
**7. TRPC routes (`get-signing-two-factor-status.ts`, `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts`) — Duplicate recipient lookup**
|
||||
Both routes look up a recipient by token with the same query shape. This is a minor duplication but extracting it would add indirection for little gain in 2 files. Skip.
|
||||
|
||||
**8. `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — `hasActiveToken` and `hasValidProof` derived from nullable**
|
||||
`const hasActiveToken = statusQuery.data?.hasActiveToken ?? false` — this is fine but could use the `!statusQuery.isLoading` guard more cleanly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
### Core Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Reduce redundancy and improve clarity in the External 2FA implementation without changing behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
### Concrete Deliverables
|
||||
|
||||
- Simplified `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` with combined throw-with-audit helper
|
||||
- Simplified `issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts` with extracted denial helper
|
||||
- Cleaner `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` with derived state instead of duplicated state
|
||||
- All E2E tests pass unchanged
|
||||
|
||||
### Definition of Done
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] `npm run lint` passes
|
||||
- [ ] E2E tests in `external-2fa-auth.spec.ts` pass
|
||||
- [ ] No behavioral changes — same error codes, same HTTP statuses, same UI behavior
|
||||
|
||||
### Must Have
|
||||
|
||||
- Zero behavioral changes
|
||||
- All existing tests pass
|
||||
- Follow project coding standards (AGENTS.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### Must NOT Have (Guardrails)
|
||||
|
||||
- No new files
|
||||
- No changes to schema.prisma, migration, or types files
|
||||
- No changes to E2E test files
|
||||
- No renaming of exported functions or types (public API stability)
|
||||
- No "clever" abstractions that reduce readability
|
||||
- Do not change any string literals used as error/reason codes
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
### Test Decision
|
||||
|
||||
- **Infrastructure exists**: YES
|
||||
- **Automated tests**: Tests-after (verify existing tests still pass)
|
||||
- **Framework**: Playwright E2E
|
||||
|
||||
### Agent-Executed QA Scenarios (MANDATORY)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Scenario: All E2E tests still pass after simplification
|
||||
Tool: Bash
|
||||
Preconditions: Dev dependencies installed, database running
|
||||
Steps:
|
||||
1. Run: npx tsc --noEmit -p packages/lib/tsconfig.json
|
||||
2. Assert: Exit code 0 (no type errors in lib)
|
||||
3. Run: npm run lint
|
||||
4. Assert: Exit code 0
|
||||
Expected Result: Type checking and linting pass
|
||||
Evidence: Terminal output captured
|
||||
|
||||
Scenario: Verify unchanged behavior via E2E
|
||||
Tool: Bash
|
||||
Preconditions: Dev server and database running
|
||||
Steps:
|
||||
1. Run: npm run test:dev -w @documenso/app-tests -- --grep "EXTERNAL_2FA"
|
||||
2. Assert: All 6 test cases pass
|
||||
Expected Result: 6/6 tests pass
|
||||
Evidence: Test output captured
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Execution Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
### Parallel Execution Waves
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Wave 1 (Start Immediately):
|
||||
├── Task 1: Simplify server-side verify token logic
|
||||
├── Task 2: Simplify server-side issue token logic
|
||||
└── Task 3: Simplify External 2FA UI component
|
||||
|
||||
Wave 2 (After Wave 1):
|
||||
└── Task 4: Lint fix pass
|
||||
|
||||
Wave 3 (After Wave 2):
|
||||
└── Task 5: Type check + lint verification
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TODOs
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] 1. Simplify `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — combine audit-log + throw
|
||||
|
||||
**What to do**:
|
||||
- Create a `throwVerificationError` helper that combines `createVerifyFailedAuditLog` + `throw new AppError(...)` in one call
|
||||
- Replace the 4 repetitive blocks (not-issued, expired, attempt-limit, invalid) with calls to this helper
|
||||
- The helper should accept: `{ envelopeId, recipient, tokenId, reasonCode, attemptsUsed, attemptLimit, errorCode, statusCode }`
|
||||
- For the expired case, keep the status update to `EXPIRED` before calling the helper
|
||||
- For the attempt-limit case, keep the status update to `REVOKED` before calling the helper
|
||||
- For the invalid case, keep the attempt increment before calling the helper
|
||||
- The point is to eliminate the repeated `await createVerifyFailedAuditLog(...);\n throw new AppError(...)` pattern
|
||||
|
||||
**Must NOT do**:
|
||||
- Change any reason code strings
|
||||
- Change any HTTP status codes
|
||||
- Change the order of operations (status update must happen before audit log)
|
||||
- Change the transaction logic for the success path
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommended Agent Profile**:
|
||||
- **Category**: `quick`
|
||||
- **Skills**: []
|
||||
|
||||
**Parallelization**:
|
||||
- **Can Run In Parallel**: YES
|
||||
- **Parallel Group**: Wave 1 (with Tasks 2, 3)
|
||||
- **Blocks**: Task 4
|
||||
- **Blocked By**: None
|
||||
|
||||
**References**:
|
||||
- `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — full file, focus on the 4 error blocks between lines 71-157 and the existing `createVerifyFailedAuditLog` helper at the bottom
|
||||
- `packages/lib/errors/app-error.ts` — AppError and AppErrorCode usage pattern
|
||||
|
||||
**Acceptance Criteria**:
|
||||
- [ ] 4 audit-log + throw blocks reduced to single-line helper calls
|
||||
- [ ] `createVerifyFailedAuditLog` helper is either replaced or combined with throw logic
|
||||
- [ ] No change to any reason code string or HTTP status code
|
||||
- [ ] File compiles without errors: `npx tsc --noEmit`
|
||||
|
||||
**Commit**: YES (groups with 2, 3)
|
||||
- Message: `refactor(signing-2fa): simplify server-side 2FA token logic`
|
||||
- Files: `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] 2. Simplify `issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — extract denial helper
|
||||
|
||||
**What to do**:
|
||||
- Extract a `throwIssuanceDenied` helper for the repeated audit-log + throw pattern used for `TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED` and `TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE`
|
||||
- Helper signature: `{ envelopeId, recipient, reasonCode }` → creates audit log + throws AppError
|
||||
- Replace both blocks (~20 lines each) with one-line calls
|
||||
|
||||
**Must NOT do**:
|
||||
- Change any reason code strings
|
||||
- Change any HTTP status codes
|
||||
- Alter the transaction logic
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommended Agent Profile**:
|
||||
- **Category**: `quick`
|
||||
- **Skills**: []
|
||||
|
||||
**Parallelization**:
|
||||
- **Can Run In Parallel**: YES
|
||||
- **Parallel Group**: Wave 1 (with Tasks 1, 3)
|
||||
- **Blocks**: Task 4
|
||||
- **Blocked By**: None
|
||||
|
||||
**References**:
|
||||
- `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts` — the two denial blocks after `requiresExternal2FA` check and `signingStatus === 'SIGNED'` check
|
||||
|
||||
**Acceptance Criteria**:
|
||||
- [ ] Two denial blocks reduced to single-line helper calls
|
||||
- [ ] No change to any reason code or status code
|
||||
- [ ] File compiles: `npx tsc --noEmit`
|
||||
|
||||
**Commit**: YES (groups with 1, 3)
|
||||
- Message: `refactor(signing-2fa): simplify server-side 2FA token logic`
|
||||
- Files: `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] 3. Simplify `document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — eliminate duplicated state
|
||||
|
||||
**What to do**:
|
||||
- **Remove `attemptsRemaining` state entirely**. Instead, derive it directly from `statusQuery.data?.attemptsRemaining ?? null` in the render. This eliminates:
|
||||
- The `useState` for `attemptsRemaining`
|
||||
- The second `useEffect` that syncs `statusQuery.data?.attemptsRemaining` into state
|
||||
- The manual client-side decrement in the error handler
|
||||
- **After a failed verify mutation**, call `statusQuery.refetch()` so the server is the single source of truth for attempts remaining
|
||||
- **Remove the first `useEffect`'s `setAttemptsRemaining(null)` call** since there's no state to reset
|
||||
- **Keep `formError` state** — it's legitimately local UI state
|
||||
- **In the error handler if/else chain**: This is acceptable per AGENTS.md guidelines. Leave it as-is — it's readable and clear. But do change the fragile `error.message` comparisons to use the imported `SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES` constants from `verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts` for type safety.
|
||||
|
||||
**Must NOT do**:
|
||||
- Change any user-visible strings
|
||||
- Change the PIN input component or form structure
|
||||
- Add any new dependencies/imports beyond the reason code constants
|
||||
- Remove the `formError` state (it's needed for showing errors)
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommended Agent Profile**:
|
||||
- **Category**: `quick`
|
||||
- **Skills**: []
|
||||
|
||||
**Parallelization**:
|
||||
- **Can Run In Parallel**: YES
|
||||
- **Parallel Group**: Wave 1 (with Tasks 1, 2)
|
||||
- **Blocks**: Task 4
|
||||
- **Blocked By**: None
|
||||
|
||||
**References**:
|
||||
- `apps/remix/app/components/general/document-signing/document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx` — full new file, focus on useState/useEffect/error-handler
|
||||
- `packages/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts:SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES` — the constants to import for type-safe error matching
|
||||
- `apps/remix/app/components/general/document-signing/document-signing-auth-2fa.tsx` — existing sibling component for pattern reference
|
||||
|
||||
**Acceptance Criteria**:
|
||||
- [ ] `attemptsRemaining` state removed; derived from `statusQuery.data` directly
|
||||
- [ ] Second `useEffect` (syncing attemptsRemaining) removed
|
||||
- [ ] `statusQuery.refetch()` called after failed verify
|
||||
- [ ] Error handler uses imported constants instead of string literals
|
||||
- [ ] File compiles: `npx tsc --noEmit`
|
||||
|
||||
**Commit**: YES (groups with 1, 2)
|
||||
- Message: `refactor(signing-2fa): simplify server-side 2FA token logic`
|
||||
- Files: `apps/remix/app/components/general/document-signing/document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] 4. Lint fix pass
|
||||
|
||||
**What to do**:
|
||||
- Run `npm run lint:fix` to auto-fix any formatting issues introduced by the refactors
|
||||
- Run `npm run format` for Prettier
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommended Agent Profile**:
|
||||
- **Category**: `quick`
|
||||
- **Skills**: []
|
||||
|
||||
**Parallelization**:
|
||||
- **Can Run In Parallel**: NO
|
||||
- **Parallel Group**: Wave 2
|
||||
- **Blocks**: Task 5
|
||||
- **Blocked By**: Tasks 1, 2, 3
|
||||
|
||||
**Acceptance Criteria**:
|
||||
- [ ] `npm run lint` exits 0
|
||||
- [ ] `npm run format` exits 0
|
||||
|
||||
**Commit**: YES
|
||||
- Message: `chore: lint fix`
|
||||
- Files: any auto-fixed files
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] 5. Type check + final verification
|
||||
|
||||
**What to do**:
|
||||
- Run `npx tsc --noEmit` from root to verify no type errors
|
||||
- Run `npm run lint` to confirm clean
|
||||
|
||||
**Must NOT do**:
|
||||
- Run full build (too slow per AGENTS.md)
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommended Agent Profile**:
|
||||
- **Category**: `quick`
|
||||
- **Skills**: []
|
||||
|
||||
**Parallelization**:
|
||||
- **Can Run In Parallel**: NO
|
||||
- **Parallel Group**: Wave 3
|
||||
- **Blocks**: None
|
||||
- **Blocked By**: Task 4
|
||||
|
||||
**Acceptance Criteria**:
|
||||
- [ ] `npx tsc --noEmit` exits 0
|
||||
- [ ] `npm run lint` exits 0
|
||||
|
||||
**Commit**: NO
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Commit Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
| After Task(s) | Message | Files |
|
||||
| ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| 1, 2, 3 | `refactor(signing-2fa): simplify server-side and UI code for external 2FA` | verify-signing-two-factor-token.ts, issue-signing-two-factor-token.ts, document-signing-auth-external-2fa.tsx |
|
||||
| 4 | `chore: lint fix` (only if needed) | any auto-fixed |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
### Verification Commands
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
npx tsc --noEmit # Expected: clean exit
|
||||
npm run lint # Expected: clean exit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Final Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] All simplifications preserve exact behavior
|
||||
- [ ] No new files created
|
||||
- [ ] No changes to types, schema, migration, or test files
|
||||
- [ ] Reduced total line count in modified files
|
||||
- [ ] Error codes and HTTP statuses unchanged
|
||||
+17
-10
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import {
|
||||
|
||||
import { DocumentSigningAuth2FA } from './document-signing-auth-2fa';
|
||||
import { DocumentSigningAuthAccount } from './document-signing-auth-account';
|
||||
import { DocumentSigningAuthExternal2FA } from './document-signing-auth-external-2fa';
|
||||
import { DocumentSigningAuthPasskey } from './document-signing-auth-passkey';
|
||||
import { DocumentSigningAuthPassword } from './document-signing-auth-password';
|
||||
import { useRequiredDocumentSigningAuthContext } from './document-signing-auth-provider';
|
||||
@@ -69,15 +70,8 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthDialog = ({
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reset selected auth type when dialog closes
|
||||
if (!value) {
|
||||
setSelectedAuthType(() => {
|
||||
if (validAuthTypes.length === 1) {
|
||||
return validAuthTypes[0];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
});
|
||||
setSelectedAuthType(validAuthTypes.length === 1 ? validAuthTypes[0] : null);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
onOpenChange(value);
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +117,7 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthDialog = ({
|
||||
{/* Show chooser if no auth type is selected and there are multiple options */}
|
||||
{!selectedAuthType && validAuthTypes.length > 1 && (
|
||||
<div className="space-y-4">
|
||||
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-sm">
|
||||
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">
|
||||
<Trans>Choose your preferred authentication method:</Trans>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<div className="grid gap-2">
|
||||
@@ -141,11 +135,14 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthDialog = ({
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.ACCOUNT, () => <Trans>Account</Trans>)
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.PASSKEY, () => <Trans>Passkey</Trans>)
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH, () => <Trans>2FA</Trans>)
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH, () => (
|
||||
<Trans>Verification code</Trans>
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.PASSWORD, () => <Trans>Password</Trans>)
|
||||
.exhaustive()}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div className="text-muted-foreground text-sm">
|
||||
<div className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">
|
||||
{match(authType)
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.ACCOUNT, () => <Trans>Sign in to your account</Trans>)
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.PASSKEY, () => (
|
||||
@@ -154,6 +151,9 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthDialog = ({
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH, () => (
|
||||
<Trans>Enter your 2FA code</Trans>
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH, () => (
|
||||
<Trans>Enter the verification code provided to you</Trans>
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with(DocumentAuth.PASSWORD, () => <Trans>Enter your password</Trans>)
|
||||
.exhaustive()}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@@ -197,6 +197,13 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthDialog = ({
|
||||
onReauthFormSubmit={onReauthFormSubmit}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with({ documentAuthType: DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH }, () => (
|
||||
<DocumentSigningAuthExternal2FA
|
||||
open={open}
|
||||
onOpenChange={onOpenChange}
|
||||
onReauthFormSubmit={onReauthFormSubmit}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with({ documentAuthType: DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE }, () => null)
|
||||
.exhaustive()}
|
||||
</DialogContent>
|
||||
|
||||
+223
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
||||
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
|
||||
|
||||
import { zodResolver } from '@hookform/resolvers/zod';
|
||||
import { Trans } from '@lingui/react/macro';
|
||||
import { useForm } from 'react-hook-form';
|
||||
import { z } from 'zod';
|
||||
|
||||
import { AppError } from '@documenso/lib/errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
import { DocumentAuth, type TRecipientActionAuth } from '@documenso/lib/types/document-auth';
|
||||
import { trpc } from '@documenso/trpc/react';
|
||||
import { Alert, AlertDescription, AlertTitle } from '@documenso/ui/primitives/alert';
|
||||
import { Button } from '@documenso/ui/primitives/button';
|
||||
import { DialogFooter } from '@documenso/ui/primitives/dialog';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
Form,
|
||||
FormControl,
|
||||
FormField,
|
||||
FormItem,
|
||||
FormLabel,
|
||||
FormMessage,
|
||||
} from '@documenso/ui/primitives/form/form';
|
||||
import { PinInput, PinInputGroup, PinInputSlot } from '@documenso/ui/primitives/pin-input';
|
||||
|
||||
import { useRequiredDocumentSigningAuthContext } from './document-signing-auth-provider';
|
||||
|
||||
export type DocumentSigningAuthExternal2FAProps = {
|
||||
open: boolean;
|
||||
onOpenChange: (value: boolean) => void;
|
||||
onReauthFormSubmit: (values?: TRecipientActionAuth) => Promise<void> | void;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const ZExternal2FAFormSchema = z.object({
|
||||
code: z
|
||||
.string()
|
||||
.length(6, { message: 'Code must be exactly 6 digits' })
|
||||
.regex(/^\d{6}$/, { message: 'Code must contain only digits' }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
type TExternal2FAFormSchema = z.infer<typeof ZExternal2FAFormSchema>;
|
||||
|
||||
export const DocumentSigningAuthExternal2FA = ({
|
||||
onReauthFormSubmit,
|
||||
open,
|
||||
onOpenChange,
|
||||
}: DocumentSigningAuthExternal2FAProps) => {
|
||||
const { recipient, isCurrentlyAuthenticating, setIsCurrentlyAuthenticating } =
|
||||
useRequiredDocumentSigningAuthContext();
|
||||
|
||||
const [formError, setFormError] = useState<string | null>(null);
|
||||
|
||||
const statusQuery = trpc.envelope.signing2fa.getStatus.useQuery(
|
||||
{ token: recipient.token },
|
||||
{ enabled: open },
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const verifyMutation = trpc.envelope.signing2fa.verify.useMutation();
|
||||
|
||||
const form = useForm<TExternal2FAFormSchema>({
|
||||
resolver: zodResolver(ZExternal2FAFormSchema),
|
||||
defaultValues: {
|
||||
code: '',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const onFormSubmit = async ({ code }: TExternal2FAFormSchema) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
setIsCurrentlyAuthenticating(true);
|
||||
setFormError(null);
|
||||
|
||||
await verifyMutation.mutateAsync({
|
||||
token: recipient.token,
|
||||
code,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await onReauthFormSubmit({
|
||||
type: DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
onOpenChange(false);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
const error = AppError.parseError(err);
|
||||
|
||||
if (error.message === SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_ATTEMPT_LIMIT_REACHED) {
|
||||
setFormError('Too many failed attempts. Please request a new code.');
|
||||
} else if (error.message === SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_TOKEN_EXPIRED) {
|
||||
setFormError('The code has expired. Please request a new code.');
|
||||
} else if (error.message === SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_NOT_ISSUED) {
|
||||
setFormError('No code has been issued yet. Please contact the document sender.');
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
setFormError('Invalid code. Please try again.');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await statusQuery.refetch();
|
||||
form.reset({ code: '' });
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
setIsCurrentlyAuthenticating(false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
useEffect(() => {
|
||||
form.reset({ code: '' });
|
||||
setFormError(null);
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
|
||||
}, [open]);
|
||||
|
||||
const attemptsRemaining = statusQuery.data?.attemptsRemaining ?? null;
|
||||
const hasActiveToken = statusQuery.data?.hasActiveToken ?? false;
|
||||
const hasValidProof = statusQuery.data?.hasValidProof ?? false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (hasValidProof) {
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<div className="space-y-4">
|
||||
<Alert>
|
||||
<AlertDescription>
|
||||
<Trans>Your identity has already been verified. You can proceed to sign.</Trans>
|
||||
</AlertDescription>
|
||||
</Alert>
|
||||
<DialogFooter>
|
||||
<Button
|
||||
type="button"
|
||||
onClick={async () => {
|
||||
await onReauthFormSubmit({
|
||||
type: DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
});
|
||||
onOpenChange(false);
|
||||
}}
|
||||
>
|
||||
<Trans>Continue</Trans>
|
||||
</Button>
|
||||
</DialogFooter>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!hasActiveToken && !statusQuery.isLoading) {
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<div className="space-y-4">
|
||||
<Alert variant="warning">
|
||||
<AlertTitle>
|
||||
<Trans>Verification code required</Trans>
|
||||
</AlertTitle>
|
||||
<AlertDescription>
|
||||
<Trans>
|
||||
A verification code is required to sign this document. Please contact the document
|
||||
sender to request your code.
|
||||
</Trans>
|
||||
</AlertDescription>
|
||||
</Alert>
|
||||
<DialogFooter>
|
||||
<Button type="button" variant="secondary" onClick={() => onOpenChange(false)}>
|
||||
<Trans>Close</Trans>
|
||||
</Button>
|
||||
</DialogFooter>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<Form {...form}>
|
||||
<form onSubmit={form.handleSubmit(onFormSubmit)}>
|
||||
<fieldset disabled={isCurrentlyAuthenticating}>
|
||||
<div className="space-y-4">
|
||||
<p className="text-sm text-muted-foreground">
|
||||
<Trans>Enter the 6-digit verification code that was provided to you.</Trans>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<FormField
|
||||
control={form.control}
|
||||
name="code"
|
||||
render={({ field }) => (
|
||||
<FormItem>
|
||||
<FormLabel required>
|
||||
<Trans>Verification code</Trans>
|
||||
</FormLabel>
|
||||
|
||||
<FormControl>
|
||||
<PinInput {...field} value={field.value ?? ''} maxLength={6}>
|
||||
{Array(6)
|
||||
.fill(null)
|
||||
.map((_, i) => (
|
||||
<PinInputGroup key={i}>
|
||||
<PinInputSlot index={i} />
|
||||
</PinInputGroup>
|
||||
))}
|
||||
</PinInput>
|
||||
</FormControl>
|
||||
|
||||
<FormMessage />
|
||||
</FormItem>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
|
||||
{attemptsRemaining !== null && attemptsRemaining > 0 && (
|
||||
<p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
|
||||
<Trans>{attemptsRemaining} attempts remaining</Trans>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
|
||||
{formError && (
|
||||
<Alert variant="destructive">
|
||||
<AlertTitle>
|
||||
<Trans>Verification failed</Trans>
|
||||
</AlertTitle>
|
||||
<AlertDescription>{formError}</AlertDescription>
|
||||
</Alert>
|
||||
)}
|
||||
|
||||
<DialogFooter>
|
||||
<Button type="button" variant="secondary" onClick={() => onOpenChange(false)}>
|
||||
<Trans>Cancel</Trans>
|
||||
</Button>
|
||||
|
||||
<Button type="submit" loading={isCurrentlyAuthenticating}>
|
||||
<Trans>Verify</Trans>
|
||||
</Button>
|
||||
</DialogFooter>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</fieldset>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
</Form>
|
||||
);
|
||||
};
|
||||
+9
-6
@@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ export const useRequiredDocumentSigningAuthContext = () => {
|
||||
return context;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export interface DocumentSigningAuthProviderProps {
|
||||
export type DocumentSigningAuthProviderProps = {
|
||||
documentAuthOptions: Envelope['authOptions'];
|
||||
recipient: SigningAuthRecipient;
|
||||
isDirectTemplate?: boolean;
|
||||
user?: SessionUser | null;
|
||||
children: React.ReactNode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const DocumentSigningAuthProvider = ({
|
||||
documentAuthOptions: initialDocumentAuthOptions,
|
||||
@@ -181,11 +181,14 @@ export const DocumentSigningAuthProvider = ({
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
|
||||
}, [passkeyData.passkeys]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assume that a user must be logged in for any auth requirements.
|
||||
const authMethodsRequiringLogin = derivedRecipientActionAuth?.filter(
|
||||
(method) =>
|
||||
method !== DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE && method !== DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const isAuthRedirectRequired = Boolean(
|
||||
derivedRecipientActionAuth &&
|
||||
derivedRecipientActionAuth.length > 0 &&
|
||||
!derivedRecipientActionAuth.includes(DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE) &&
|
||||
authMethodsRequiringLogin &&
|
||||
authMethodsRequiringLogin.length > 0 &&
|
||||
user?.email !== recipient.email,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -114,8 +114,12 @@ export const DocumentSigningAutoSign = ({ recipient, fields }: DocumentSigningAu
|
||||
}))
|
||||
.with(undefined, () => undefined)
|
||||
.with(
|
||||
P.union(DocumentAuth.PASSKEY, DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH, DocumentAuth.PASSWORD),
|
||||
// This is a bit dirty, but the sentinel value used here is incredibly short-lived.
|
||||
P.union(
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSKEY,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSWORD,
|
||||
),
|
||||
() => 'NOT_SUPPORTED' as const,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.exhaustive();
|
||||
@@ -165,7 +169,7 @@ export const DocumentSigningAutoSign = ({ recipient, fields }: DocumentSigningAu
|
||||
<DialogTitle>Automatically sign fields</DialogTitle>
|
||||
</DialogHeader>
|
||||
|
||||
<div className="text-muted-foreground max-w-[50ch]">
|
||||
<div className="max-w-[50ch] text-muted-foreground">
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
<Trans>
|
||||
When you sign a document, we can automatically fill in and sign the following fields
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ export default function SigningCertificate({ loaderData }: Route.ComponentProps)
|
||||
let authLevel = match(actionAuthMethod)
|
||||
.with('ACCOUNT', () => _(msg`Account Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('TWO_FACTOR_AUTH', () => _(msg`Two-Factor Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH', () => _(msg`External Two-Factor Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('PASSWORD', () => _(msg`Password Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('PASSKEY', () => _(msg`Passkey Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('EXPLICIT_NONE', () => _(msg`Email`))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
|
||||
import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
import { FieldType } from '@prisma/client';
|
||||
|
||||
import { issueSigningTwoFactorToken } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/issue-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
createDocumentAuthOptions,
|
||||
createRecipientAuthOptions,
|
||||
} from '@documenso/lib/utils/document-auth';
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
import { seedPendingDocumentWithFullFields } from '@documenso/prisma/seed/documents';
|
||||
import { seedTestEmail, seedUser } from '@documenso/prisma/seed/users';
|
||||
|
||||
import { signSignaturePad } from '../fixtures/signature';
|
||||
|
||||
test.describe.configure({ mode: 'parallel', timeout: 60000 });
|
||||
|
||||
const seedExternal2FADocument = async (recipientEmail?: string) => {
|
||||
const { user: owner, team } = await seedUser();
|
||||
|
||||
const recipientArg = recipientEmail ?? seedTestEmail();
|
||||
|
||||
const { recipients, document } = await seedPendingDocumentWithFullFields({
|
||||
owner,
|
||||
teamId: team.id,
|
||||
recipients: [recipientArg],
|
||||
recipientsCreateOptions: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
authOptions: createRecipientAuthOptions({
|
||||
accessAuth: [],
|
||||
actionAuth: ['EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH'],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
fields: [FieldType.SIGNATURE],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const apiToken = await prisma.apiToken.create({
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
name: 'test-2fa-token',
|
||||
token: `test-${Date.now()}-${Math.random()}`,
|
||||
teamId: team.id,
|
||||
userId: owner.id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return { owner, team, document, recipient: recipients[0], apiToken };
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should allow signing when valid code is entered', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
const { document, recipient, apiToken } = await seedExternal2FADocument();
|
||||
|
||||
const { token: plaintextCode } = await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
await signSignaturePad(page);
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const pinInputs = page.locator('input[data-input-otp-placeholder]');
|
||||
await pinInputs.first().click();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const digit of plaintextCode.split('')) {
|
||||
await page.keyboard.type(digit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Verify' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`)).toHaveAttribute(
|
||||
'data-inserted',
|
||||
'true',
|
||||
{ timeout: 10000 },
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Complete' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Sign' }).click();
|
||||
await page.waitForURL(`${signUrl}/complete`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should deny signing field when no token has been issued', async ({
|
||||
page,
|
||||
}) => {
|
||||
const { recipient } = await seedExternal2FADocument();
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code required')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Please contact the document sender')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should show error when invalid code is entered', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
const { document, recipient, apiToken } = await seedExternal2FADocument();
|
||||
|
||||
await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const pinInputs = page.locator('input[data-input-otp-placeholder]');
|
||||
await pinInputs.first().click();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const digit of '000000'.split('')) {
|
||||
await page.keyboard.type(digit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Verify' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification failed')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10000 });
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Invalid code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should show expired error when token has expired', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
const { document, recipient, apiToken } = await seedExternal2FADocument();
|
||||
|
||||
await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.updateMany({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
status: 'ACTIVE',
|
||||
},
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const pinInputs = page.locator('input[data-input-otp-placeholder]');
|
||||
await pinInputs.first().click();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const digit of '123456'.split('')) {
|
||||
await page.keyboard.type(digit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Verify' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification failed')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10000 });
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('code has expired')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should allow signing with global action auth on document', async ({
|
||||
page,
|
||||
}) => {
|
||||
const { user: owner, team } = await seedUser();
|
||||
|
||||
const { recipients, document } = await seedPendingDocumentWithFullFields({
|
||||
owner,
|
||||
teamId: team.id,
|
||||
recipients: [seedTestEmail()],
|
||||
recipientsCreateOptions: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
authOptions: createRecipientAuthOptions({
|
||||
accessAuth: [],
|
||||
actionAuth: [],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
updateDocumentOptions: {
|
||||
authOptions: createDocumentAuthOptions({
|
||||
globalAccessAuth: [],
|
||||
globalActionAuth: ['EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH'],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
},
|
||||
fields: [FieldType.SIGNATURE],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const recipient = recipients[0];
|
||||
|
||||
const apiToken = await prisma.apiToken.create({
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
name: 'test-2fa-global',
|
||||
token: `test-global-${Date.now()}-${Math.random()}`,
|
||||
teamId: team.id,
|
||||
userId: owner.id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { token: plaintextCode } = await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
await signSignaturePad(page);
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const pinInputs = page.locator('input[data-input-otp-placeholder]');
|
||||
await pinInputs.first().click();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const digit of plaintextCode.split('')) {
|
||||
await page.keyboard.type(digit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Verify' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`)).toHaveAttribute(
|
||||
'data-inserted',
|
||||
'true',
|
||||
{ timeout: 10000 },
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Complete' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Sign' }).click();
|
||||
await page.waitForURL(`${signUrl}/complete`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('[EXTERNAL_2FA]: should revoke old token when a new one is issued', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
const { document, recipient, apiToken } = await seedExternal2FADocument();
|
||||
|
||||
await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const { token: newCode } = await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const revokedTokens = await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.findMany({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
envelopeId: document.id,
|
||||
status: 'REVOKED',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
expect(revokedTokens.length).toBe(1);
|
||||
|
||||
const signUrl = `/sign/${recipient.token}`;
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(signUrl);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Sign Document' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
await signSignaturePad(page);
|
||||
|
||||
const signatureField = recipient.fields.find((f) => f.type === FieldType.SIGNATURE);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signatureField) {
|
||||
throw new Error('No signature field found');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`).getByRole('button').click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('Verification code')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
|
||||
const pinInputs = page.locator('input[data-input-otp-placeholder]');
|
||||
await pinInputs.first().click();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const digit of newCode.split('')) {
|
||||
await page.keyboard.type(digit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Verify' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.locator(`#field-${signatureField.id}`)).toHaveAttribute(
|
||||
'data-inserted',
|
||||
'true',
|
||||
{ timeout: 10000 },
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ export const DOCUMENT_AUTH_TYPES: Record<string, DocumentAuthTypeData> = {
|
||||
key: DocumentAuth.PASSWORD,
|
||||
value: msg`Require password`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
[DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH]: {
|
||||
key: DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
value: msg`Require external 2FA`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
[DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE]: {
|
||||
key: DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE,
|
||||
value: msg`None (Overrides global settings)`,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -155,12 +155,28 @@ export const completeDocumentWithToken = async ({
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check ACCESS AUTH 2FA validation during document completion
|
||||
const { derivedRecipientAccessAuth } = extractDocumentAuthMethods({
|
||||
const { derivedRecipientAccessAuth, derivedRecipientActionAuth } = extractDocumentAuthMethods({
|
||||
documentAuth: envelope.authOptions,
|
||||
recipientAuth: recipient.authOptions,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (derivedRecipientActionAuth.includes(DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH)) {
|
||||
const validProof = await prisma.signingSessionTwoFactorProof.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
sessionId: token,
|
||||
envelopeId: envelope.id,
|
||||
expiresAt: { gt: new Date() },
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!validProof) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED, {
|
||||
message: 'External 2FA verification required before completing document',
|
||||
statusCode: 403,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (derivedRecipientAccessAuth.includes(DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH)) {
|
||||
if (!accessAuthOptions) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED, {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ type IsRecipientAuthorizedOptions = {
|
||||
* using the user ID.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
authOptions?: TDocumentAuthMethods;
|
||||
recipientToken?: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const getUserByEmail = async (email: string) => {
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ export const isRecipientAuthorized = async ({
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
userId,
|
||||
authOptions,
|
||||
recipientToken,
|
||||
}: IsRecipientAuthorizedOptions): Promise<boolean> => {
|
||||
const { derivedRecipientAccessAuth, derivedRecipientActionAuth } = extractDocumentAuthMethods({
|
||||
documentAuth: documentAuthOptions,
|
||||
@@ -168,6 +170,21 @@ export const isRecipientAuthorized = async ({
|
||||
password,
|
||||
});
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH }, async () => {
|
||||
if (!recipientToken) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const validProof = await prisma.signingSessionTwoFactorProof.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
sessionId: recipientToken,
|
||||
envelopeId: recipient.envelopeId,
|
||||
expiresAt: { gt: new Date() },
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return !!validProof;
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE }, () => {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ export type ValidateFieldAuthOptions = {
|
||||
field: Field;
|
||||
userId?: number;
|
||||
authOptions?: TRecipientActionAuth;
|
||||
recipientToken?: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ export const validateFieldAuth = async ({
|
||||
field,
|
||||
userId,
|
||||
authOptions,
|
||||
recipientToken,
|
||||
}: ValidateFieldAuthOptions) => {
|
||||
// Override all non-signature fields to not require any auth.
|
||||
if (field.type !== FieldType.SIGNATURE) {
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +38,7 @@ export const validateFieldAuth = async ({
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
userId,
|
||||
authOptions,
|
||||
recipientToken,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!isValid) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ export const signFieldWithToken = async ({
|
||||
field,
|
||||
userId,
|
||||
authOptions,
|
||||
recipientToken: token,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const documentMeta = await prisma.documentMeta.findFirst({
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ export const generateCertificatePdf = async (options: GenerateCertificatePdfOpti
|
||||
let authLevel = match(actionAuthMethod)
|
||||
.with('ACCOUNT', () => i18n._(msg`Account Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('TWO_FACTOR_AUTH', () => i18n._(msg`Two-Factor Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH', () => i18n._(msg`External Two-Factor Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('PASSWORD', () => i18n._(msg`Password Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('PASSKEY', () => i18n._(msg`Passkey Re-Authentication`))
|
||||
.with('EXPLICIT_NONE', () => i18n._(msg`Email`))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
|
||||
import { DocumentAuth } from '../../types/document-auth';
|
||||
import { extractDocumentAuthMethods } from '../../utils/document-auth';
|
||||
|
||||
export type GetSigningTwoFactorStatusOptions = {
|
||||
recipientId: number;
|
||||
envelopeId: string;
|
||||
sessionId: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export type SigningTwoFactorStatus = {
|
||||
required: boolean;
|
||||
hasActiveToken: boolean;
|
||||
hasValidProof: boolean;
|
||||
tokenExpiresAt: Date | null;
|
||||
proofExpiresAt: Date | null;
|
||||
attemptsRemaining: number | null;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const NOT_REQUIRED_STATUS: SigningTwoFactorStatus = {
|
||||
required: false,
|
||||
hasActiveToken: false,
|
||||
hasValidProof: false,
|
||||
tokenExpiresAt: null,
|
||||
proofExpiresAt: null,
|
||||
attemptsRemaining: null,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const getSigningTwoFactorStatus = async ({
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
}: GetSigningTwoFactorStatusOptions): Promise<SigningTwoFactorStatus> => {
|
||||
const envelope = await prisma.envelope.findFirst({
|
||||
where: { id: envelopeId },
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
authOptions: true,
|
||||
recipients: {
|
||||
where: { id: recipientId },
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
authOptions: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!envelope || envelope.recipients.length === 0) {
|
||||
return NOT_REQUIRED_STATUS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const [recipient] = envelope.recipients;
|
||||
|
||||
const { derivedRecipientActionAuth } = extractDocumentAuthMethods({
|
||||
documentAuth: envelope.authOptions,
|
||||
recipientAuth: recipient.authOptions,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const required = derivedRecipientActionAuth.includes(DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!required) {
|
||||
return NOT_REQUIRED_STATUS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const now = new Date();
|
||||
|
||||
const [activeToken, validProof] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
status: 'ACTIVE',
|
||||
expiresAt: { gt: now },
|
||||
},
|
||||
orderBy: { createdAt: 'desc' },
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
expiresAt: true,
|
||||
attempts: true,
|
||||
attemptLimit: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
prisma.signingSessionTwoFactorProof.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
expiresAt: { gt: now },
|
||||
},
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
expiresAt: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
required: true,
|
||||
hasActiveToken: !!activeToken,
|
||||
hasValidProof: !!validProof,
|
||||
tokenExpiresAt: activeToken?.expiresAt ?? null,
|
||||
proofExpiresAt: validProof?.expiresAt ?? null,
|
||||
attemptsRemaining: activeToken
|
||||
? Math.max(0, activeToken.attemptLimit - activeToken.attempts)
|
||||
: null,
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
|
||||
import { DocumentStatus, EnvelopeType } from '@prisma/client';
|
||||
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
|
||||
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '../../errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE } from '../../types/document-audit-logs';
|
||||
import { DocumentAuth } from '../../types/document-auth';
|
||||
import { createDocumentAuditLogData } from '../../utils/document-audit-logs';
|
||||
import { extractDocumentAuthMethods } from '../../utils/document-auth';
|
||||
import { generateSigningTwoFactorToken, generateTokenSalt, hashToken } from './token-utils';
|
||||
|
||||
const TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES = 10;
|
||||
const DEFAULT_ATTEMPT_LIMIT = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
export const SIGNING_2FA_REASON_CODES = {
|
||||
TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED: 'TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED',
|
||||
TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE: 'TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE',
|
||||
TWO_FA_ISSUER_FORBIDDEN: 'TWO_FA_ISSUER_FORBIDDEN',
|
||||
} as const;
|
||||
|
||||
export type IssueSigningTwoFactorTokenOptions = {
|
||||
recipientId: number;
|
||||
envelopeId: string;
|
||||
apiTokenId: number;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const issueSigningTwoFactorToken = async ({
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
apiTokenId,
|
||||
}: IssueSigningTwoFactorTokenOptions) => {
|
||||
const envelope = await prisma.envelope.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
id: envelopeId,
|
||||
type: EnvelopeType.DOCUMENT,
|
||||
},
|
||||
include: {
|
||||
recipients: {
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
id: recipientId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!envelope) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, {
|
||||
message: 'Envelope not found',
|
||||
statusCode: 404,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (envelope.status !== DocumentStatus.PENDING) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.INVALID_REQUEST, {
|
||||
message: `Document must be in PENDING status`,
|
||||
statusCode: 400,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (envelope.recipients.length === 0) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, {
|
||||
message: 'Recipient not found for this document',
|
||||
statusCode: 404,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const [recipient] = envelope.recipients;
|
||||
|
||||
const { derivedRecipientActionAuth } = extractDocumentAuthMethods({
|
||||
documentAuth: envelope.authOptions,
|
||||
recipientAuth: recipient.authOptions,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const requiresExternal2FA = derivedRecipientActionAuth.includes(
|
||||
DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!requiresExternal2FA) {
|
||||
await throwIssuanceDenied({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_NOT_REQUIRED,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (recipient.signingStatus === 'SIGNED') {
|
||||
await throwIssuanceDenied({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_RECIPIENT_INELIGIBLE,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const plaintextToken = generateSigningTwoFactorToken();
|
||||
const salt = generateTokenSalt();
|
||||
const tokenHash = hashToken(plaintextToken, salt);
|
||||
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES * 60 * 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
|
||||
await tx.signingTwoFactorToken.updateMany({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
status: 'ACTIVE',
|
||||
},
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
status: 'REVOKED',
|
||||
revokedAt: new Date(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const newToken = await tx.signingTwoFactorToken.create({
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
tokenHash,
|
||||
tokenSalt: salt,
|
||||
expiresAt,
|
||||
attemptLimit: DEFAULT_ATTEMPT_LIMIT,
|
||||
issuedByApiTokenId: apiTokenId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await tx.documentAuditLog.create({
|
||||
data: createDocumentAuditLogData({
|
||||
type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUED,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
recipientEmail: recipient.email,
|
||||
recipientName: recipient.name,
|
||||
tokenId: newToken.id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return newToken;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
token: plaintextToken,
|
||||
tokenId: result.id,
|
||||
expiresAt: result.expiresAt,
|
||||
ttlSeconds: TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES * 60,
|
||||
attemptLimit: result.attemptLimit,
|
||||
issuedAt: result.createdAt,
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const throwIssuanceDenied = async ({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
reasonCode,
|
||||
}: {
|
||||
envelopeId: string;
|
||||
recipient: { id: number; email: string; name: string | null };
|
||||
reasonCode: string;
|
||||
}) => {
|
||||
await prisma.documentAuditLog.create({
|
||||
data: createDocumentAuditLogData({
|
||||
type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
recipientEmail: recipient.email,
|
||||
recipientName: recipient.name ?? '',
|
||||
reasonCode,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.INVALID_REQUEST, {
|
||||
message: reasonCode,
|
||||
statusCode: 400,
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
import crypto from 'crypto';
|
||||
|
||||
const TOKEN_LENGTH = 6;
|
||||
const SALT_LENGTH = 32;
|
||||
const HASH_ITERATIONS = 100000;
|
||||
const HASH_KEY_LENGTH = 64;
|
||||
const HASH_DIGEST = 'sha512';
|
||||
|
||||
export const generateSigningTwoFactorToken = (): string => {
|
||||
const bytes = crypto.randomBytes(4);
|
||||
const num = bytes.readUInt32BE(0) % 10 ** TOKEN_LENGTH;
|
||||
|
||||
return num.toString().padStart(TOKEN_LENGTH, '0');
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const generateTokenSalt = (): string => {
|
||||
return crypto.randomBytes(SALT_LENGTH).toString('hex');
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const hashToken = (token: string, salt: string): string => {
|
||||
return crypto
|
||||
.pbkdf2Sync(token, salt, HASH_ITERATIONS, HASH_KEY_LENGTH, HASH_DIGEST)
|
||||
.toString('hex');
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const verifyTokenHash = (token: string, salt: string, expectedHash: string): boolean => {
|
||||
const hash = hashToken(token, salt);
|
||||
|
||||
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(hash, 'hex'), Buffer.from(expectedHash, 'hex'));
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
|
||||
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '../../errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE } from '../../types/document-audit-logs';
|
||||
import { createDocumentAuditLogData } from '../../utils/document-audit-logs';
|
||||
import { verifyTokenHash } from './token-utils';
|
||||
|
||||
const PROOF_TTL_MINUTES = 10;
|
||||
|
||||
export const SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES = {
|
||||
TWO_FA_TOKEN_INVALID: 'TWO_FA_TOKEN_INVALID',
|
||||
TWO_FA_TOKEN_EXPIRED: 'TWO_FA_TOKEN_EXPIRED',
|
||||
TWO_FA_TOKEN_REVOKED: 'TWO_FA_TOKEN_REVOKED',
|
||||
TWO_FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED: 'TWO_FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED',
|
||||
TWO_FA_ATTEMPT_LIMIT_REACHED: 'TWO_FA_ATTEMPT_LIMIT_REACHED',
|
||||
TWO_FA_NOT_ISSUED: 'TWO_FA_NOT_ISSUED',
|
||||
} as const;
|
||||
|
||||
export type VerifySigningTwoFactorTokenOptions = {
|
||||
recipientId: number;
|
||||
envelopeId: string;
|
||||
token: string;
|
||||
sessionId: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const verifySigningTwoFactorToken = async ({
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
token: plaintextToken,
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
}: VerifySigningTwoFactorTokenOptions) => {
|
||||
const recipient = await prisma.recipient.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
id: recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
id: true,
|
||||
email: true,
|
||||
name: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!recipient) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, {
|
||||
message: 'Recipient not found',
|
||||
statusCode: 404,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const activeToken = await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
status: 'ACTIVE',
|
||||
},
|
||||
orderBy: {
|
||||
createdAt: 'desc',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!activeToken) {
|
||||
await throwVerificationError({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
tokenId: 'none',
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_NOT_ISSUED,
|
||||
attemptsUsed: 0,
|
||||
attemptLimit: 0,
|
||||
errorCode: AppErrorCode.INVALID_REQUEST,
|
||||
statusCode: 400,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (activeToken.expiresAt < new Date()) {
|
||||
await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.update({
|
||||
where: { id: activeToken.id },
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
status: 'EXPIRED',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await throwVerificationError({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
tokenId: activeToken.id,
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_TOKEN_EXPIRED,
|
||||
attemptsUsed: activeToken.attempts,
|
||||
attemptLimit: activeToken.attemptLimit,
|
||||
errorCode: AppErrorCode.EXPIRED_CODE,
|
||||
statusCode: 400,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (activeToken.attempts >= activeToken.attemptLimit) {
|
||||
await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.update({
|
||||
where: { id: activeToken.id },
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
status: 'REVOKED',
|
||||
revokedAt: new Date(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await throwVerificationError({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
tokenId: activeToken.id,
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_ATTEMPT_LIMIT_REACHED,
|
||||
attemptsUsed: activeToken.attempts,
|
||||
attemptLimit: activeToken.attemptLimit,
|
||||
errorCode: AppErrorCode.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
|
||||
statusCode: 429,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const isValid = verifyTokenHash(plaintextToken, activeToken.tokenSalt, activeToken.tokenHash);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!isValid) {
|
||||
const updatedToken = await prisma.signingTwoFactorToken.update({
|
||||
where: { id: activeToken.id },
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
attempts: { increment: 1 },
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await throwVerificationError({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
tokenId: activeToken.id,
|
||||
reasonCode: SIGNING_2FA_VERIFY_REASON_CODES.TWO_FA_TOKEN_INVALID,
|
||||
attemptsUsed: updatedToken.attempts,
|
||||
attemptLimit: updatedToken.attemptLimit,
|
||||
errorCode: AppErrorCode.INVALID_REQUEST,
|
||||
statusCode: 400,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const proofExpiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + PROOF_TTL_MINUTES * 60 * 1000);
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
|
||||
await tx.signingTwoFactorToken.update({
|
||||
where: { id: activeToken.id },
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
status: 'CONSUMED',
|
||||
consumedAt: new Date(),
|
||||
attempts: { increment: 1 },
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const proof = await tx.signingSessionTwoFactorProof.upsert({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
sessionId_recipientId_envelopeId: {
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
create: {
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
expiresAt: proofExpiresAt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
update: {
|
||||
verifiedAt: new Date(),
|
||||
expiresAt: proofExpiresAt,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await tx.documentAuditLog.create({
|
||||
data: createDocumentAuditLogData({
|
||||
type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
recipientEmail: recipient.email,
|
||||
recipientName: recipient.name,
|
||||
tokenId: activeToken.id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await tx.documentAuditLog.create({
|
||||
data: createDocumentAuditLogData({
|
||||
type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
recipientEmail: recipient.email,
|
||||
recipientName: recipient.name,
|
||||
tokenId: activeToken.id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return proof;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
verified: true,
|
||||
proofId: result.id,
|
||||
expiresAt: result.expiresAt,
|
||||
};
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
type ThrowVerificationErrorOptions = {
|
||||
envelopeId: string;
|
||||
recipient: { id: number; email: string; name: string };
|
||||
tokenId: string;
|
||||
reasonCode: string;
|
||||
attemptsUsed: number;
|
||||
attemptLimit: number;
|
||||
errorCode: AppErrorCode;
|
||||
statusCode: number;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const throwVerificationError = async ({
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipient,
|
||||
tokenId,
|
||||
reasonCode,
|
||||
attemptsUsed,
|
||||
attemptLimit,
|
||||
errorCode,
|
||||
statusCode,
|
||||
}: ThrowVerificationErrorOptions): Promise<never> => {
|
||||
await prisma.documentAuditLog.create({
|
||||
data: createDocumentAuditLogData({
|
||||
type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_FAILED,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
data: {
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
recipientEmail: recipient.email,
|
||||
recipientName: recipient.name,
|
||||
tokenId,
|
||||
reasonCode,
|
||||
attemptsUsed,
|
||||
attemptLimit,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
throw new AppError(errorCode, {
|
||||
message: reasonCode,
|
||||
statusCode,
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ export const ZDocumentAuditLogTypeSchema = z.enum([
|
||||
'DOCUMENT_ACCESS_AUTH_2FA_REQUESTED', // When ACCESS AUTH 2FA is requested.
|
||||
'DOCUMENT_ACCESS_AUTH_2FA_VALIDATED', // When ACCESS AUTH 2FA is successfully validated.
|
||||
'DOCUMENT_ACCESS_AUTH_2FA_FAILED', // When ACCESS AUTH 2FA validation fails.
|
||||
|
||||
// External signing 2FA events.
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUED',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_FAILED',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_REVOKED',
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEmailTypeSchema = z.enum([
|
||||
@@ -694,6 +702,59 @@ export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventDocumentDelegatedOwnerCreatedSchema = z.objec
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema = z.object({
|
||||
recipientId: z.number(),
|
||||
recipientEmail: z.string(),
|
||||
recipientName: z.string(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenIssuedSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
tokenId: z.string(),
|
||||
reasonCode: z.string().optional(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenIssueDeniedSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
reasonCode: z.string(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenVerifySucceededSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
tokenId: z.string(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenVerifyFailedSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_FAILED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
tokenId: z.string(),
|
||||
reasonCode: z.string(),
|
||||
attemptsUsed: z.number(),
|
||||
attemptLimit: z.number(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenConsumedSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
tokenId: z.string(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenRevokedSchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_REVOKED),
|
||||
data: ZExternal2FARecipientDataSchema.extend({
|
||||
tokenId: z.string(),
|
||||
reasonCode: z.string(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZDocumentAuditLogBaseSchema = z.object({
|
||||
id: z.string(),
|
||||
createdAt: z.date(),
|
||||
@@ -739,6 +800,12 @@ export const ZDocumentAuditLogSchema = ZDocumentAuditLogBaseSchema.and(
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventRecipientAddedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventRecipientUpdatedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventRecipientRemovedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenIssuedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenIssueDeniedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenVerifySucceededSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenVerifyFailedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenConsumedSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuditLogEventExternal2FATokenRevokedSchema,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ export const ZDocumentAuthTypesSchema = z.enum([
|
||||
'ACCOUNT',
|
||||
'PASSKEY',
|
||||
'TWO_FACTOR_AUTH',
|
||||
'EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH',
|
||||
'PASSWORD',
|
||||
'EXPLICIT_NONE',
|
||||
]);
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +41,10 @@ const ZDocumentAuth2FASchema = z.object({
|
||||
method: z.enum(['email', 'authenticator']).default('authenticator').optional(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const ZDocumentAuthExternal2FASchema = z.object({
|
||||
type: z.literal(DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* All the document auth methods for both accessing and actioning.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +53,7 @@ export const ZDocumentAuthMethodsSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthExplicitNoneSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasskeySchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuth2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthExternal2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasswordSchema,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +79,7 @@ export const ZDocumentActionAuthSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthAccountSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasskeySchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuth2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthExternal2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasswordSchema,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
export const ZDocumentActionAuthTypesSchema = z
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +87,7 @@ export const ZDocumentActionAuthTypesSchema = z
|
||||
DocumentAuth.ACCOUNT,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSKEY,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSWORD,
|
||||
])
|
||||
.describe(
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +116,7 @@ export const ZRecipientActionAuthSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthAccountSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasskeySchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuth2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthExternal2FASchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthPasswordSchema,
|
||||
ZDocumentAuthExplicitNoneSchema,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
@@ -116,6 +125,7 @@ export const ZRecipientActionAuthTypesSchema = z
|
||||
DocumentAuth.ACCOUNT,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSKEY,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.EXTERNAL_TWO_FACTOR_AUTH,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.PASSWORD,
|
||||
DocumentAuth.EXPLICIT_NONE,
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ export const ZClaimFlagsSchema = z.object({
|
||||
authenticationPortal: z.boolean().optional(),
|
||||
|
||||
allowLegacyEnvelopes: z.boolean().optional(),
|
||||
|
||||
externalSigning2fa: z.boolean().optional(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export type TClaimFlags = z.infer<typeof ZClaimFlagsSchema>;
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +96,11 @@ export const SUBSCRIPTION_CLAIM_FEATURE_FLAGS: Record<
|
||||
key: 'allowLegacyEnvelopes',
|
||||
label: 'Allow Legacy Envelopes',
|
||||
},
|
||||
externalSigning2fa: {
|
||||
key: 'externalSigning2fa',
|
||||
label: 'External signing 2FA',
|
||||
isEnterprise: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export enum INTERNAL_CLAIM_ID {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -582,6 +582,48 @@ export const formatDocumentAuditLogAction = (
|
||||
user: message,
|
||||
};
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA token issued for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_ISSUE_DENIED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA token issuance denied for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}: ${data.reasonCode}`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_SUCCEEDED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA verification succeeded for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_VERIFY_FAILED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA verification failed for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}: ${data.reasonCode} (attempt ${data.attemptsUsed}/${data.attemptLimit})`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_CONSUMED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA token consumed for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.with({ type: DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG_TYPE.EXTERNAL_2FA_TOKEN_REVOKED }, ({ data }) => {
|
||||
const message = msg({
|
||||
message: `External 2FA token revoked for recipient ${data.recipientEmail}`,
|
||||
context: `Audit log format`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return { anonymous: message, you: message, user: message };
|
||||
})
|
||||
.exhaustive();
|
||||
|
||||
let selectedDescription = description.anonymous;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
-- CreateEnum
|
||||
CREATE TYPE "SigningTwoFactorTokenStatus" AS ENUM ('ACTIVE', 'CONSUMED', 'REVOKED', 'EXPIRED');
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateTable
|
||||
CREATE TABLE "SigningTwoFactorToken" (
|
||||
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"recipientId" INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
"envelopeId" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"tokenHash" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"tokenSalt" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"status" "SigningTwoFactorTokenStatus" NOT NULL DEFAULT 'ACTIVE',
|
||||
"expiresAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
|
||||
"consumedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
|
||||
"revokedAt" TIMESTAMP(3),
|
||||
"attempts" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
"attemptLimit" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 5,
|
||||
"issuedByApiTokenId" INTEGER,
|
||||
"createdAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
|
||||
|
||||
CONSTRAINT "SigningTwoFactorToken_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateTable
|
||||
CREATE TABLE "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof" (
|
||||
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"sessionId" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"recipientId" INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
"envelopeId" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
"verifiedAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
|
||||
"expiresAt" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL,
|
||||
|
||||
CONSTRAINT "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateIndex
|
||||
CREATE INDEX "SigningTwoFactorToken_recipientId_envelopeId_status_idx" ON "SigningTwoFactorToken"("recipientId", "envelopeId", "status");
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateIndex
|
||||
CREATE INDEX "SigningTwoFactorToken_envelopeId_idx" ON "SigningTwoFactorToken"("envelopeId");
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateIndex
|
||||
CREATE INDEX "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_recipientId_envelopeId_idx" ON "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof"("recipientId", "envelopeId");
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateIndex
|
||||
CREATE INDEX "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_expiresAt_idx" ON "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof"("expiresAt");
|
||||
|
||||
-- CreateIndex
|
||||
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_sessionId_recipientId_envelope_key" ON "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof"("sessionId", "recipientId", "envelopeId");
|
||||
|
||||
-- AddForeignKey
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SigningTwoFactorToken" ADD CONSTRAINT "SigningTwoFactorToken_recipientId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("recipientId") REFERENCES "Recipient"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
|
||||
|
||||
-- AddForeignKey
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SigningTwoFactorToken" ADD CONSTRAINT "SigningTwoFactorToken_envelopeId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("envelopeId") REFERENCES "Envelope"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
|
||||
|
||||
-- AddForeignKey
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof" ADD CONSTRAINT "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_recipientId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("recipientId") REFERENCES "Recipient"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
|
||||
|
||||
-- AddForeignKey
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof" ADD CONSTRAINT "SigningSessionTwoFactorProof_envelopeId_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("envelopeId") REFERENCES "Envelope"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ model Envelope {
|
||||
|
||||
envelopeAttachments EnvelopeAttachment[]
|
||||
|
||||
signingTwoFactorTokens SigningTwoFactorToken[]
|
||||
signingSessionTwoFactorProofs SigningSessionTwoFactorProof[]
|
||||
|
||||
@@index([type])
|
||||
@@index([status])
|
||||
@@index([userId])
|
||||
@@ -588,6 +591,9 @@ model Recipient {
|
||||
fields Field[]
|
||||
signatures Signature[]
|
||||
|
||||
signingTwoFactorTokens SigningTwoFactorToken[]
|
||||
signingSessionTwoFactorProofs SigningSessionTwoFactorProof[]
|
||||
|
||||
@@index([token])
|
||||
@@index([email])
|
||||
@@index([envelopeId])
|
||||
@@ -1076,3 +1082,55 @@ model Counter {
|
||||
id String @id
|
||||
value Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
enum SigningTwoFactorTokenStatus {
|
||||
ACTIVE
|
||||
CONSUMED
|
||||
REVOKED
|
||||
EXPIRED
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
model SigningTwoFactorToken {
|
||||
id String @id @default(cuid())
|
||||
|
||||
recipientId Int
|
||||
envelopeId String
|
||||
|
||||
tokenHash String
|
||||
tokenSalt String
|
||||
|
||||
status SigningTwoFactorTokenStatus @default(ACTIVE)
|
||||
expiresAt DateTime
|
||||
consumedAt DateTime?
|
||||
revokedAt DateTime?
|
||||
attempts Int @default(0)
|
||||
attemptLimit Int @default(5)
|
||||
|
||||
issuedByApiTokenId Int?
|
||||
|
||||
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
|
||||
|
||||
recipient Recipient @relation(fields: [recipientId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
|
||||
envelope Envelope @relation(fields: [envelopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
|
||||
|
||||
@@index([recipientId, envelopeId, status])
|
||||
@@index([envelopeId])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
model SigningSessionTwoFactorProof {
|
||||
id String @id @default(cuid())
|
||||
|
||||
sessionId String
|
||||
recipientId Int
|
||||
envelopeId String
|
||||
|
||||
verifiedAt DateTime @default(now())
|
||||
expiresAt DateTime
|
||||
|
||||
recipient Recipient @relation(fields: [recipientId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
|
||||
envelope Envelope @relation(fields: [envelopeId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
|
||||
|
||||
@@unique([sessionId, recipientId, envelopeId])
|
||||
@@index([recipientId, envelopeId])
|
||||
@@index([expiresAt])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ import { redistributeEnvelopeRoute } from './redistribute-envelope';
|
||||
import { setEnvelopeFieldsRoute } from './set-envelope-fields';
|
||||
import { setEnvelopeRecipientsRoute } from './set-envelope-recipients';
|
||||
import { signEnvelopeFieldRoute } from './sign-envelope-field';
|
||||
import { getSigningTwoFactorStatusRoute } from './signing-2fa/get-signing-two-factor-status';
|
||||
import { issueSigningTwoFactorTokenRoute } from './signing-2fa/issue-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
import { verifySigningTwoFactorTokenRoute } from './signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
import { signingStatusEnvelopeRoute } from './signing-status-envelope';
|
||||
import { updateEnvelopeRoute } from './update-envelope';
|
||||
import { updateEnvelopeItemsRoute } from './update-envelope-items';
|
||||
@@ -87,5 +90,10 @@ export const envelopeRouter = router({
|
||||
duplicate: duplicateEnvelopeRoute,
|
||||
distribute: distributeEnvelopeRoute,
|
||||
redistribute: redistributeEnvelopeRoute,
|
||||
signing2fa: {
|
||||
issue: issueSigningTwoFactorTokenRoute,
|
||||
verify: verifySigningTwoFactorTokenRoute,
|
||||
getStatus: getSigningTwoFactorStatusRoute,
|
||||
},
|
||||
signingStatus: signingStatusEnvelopeRoute,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ export const signEnvelopeFieldRoute = procedure
|
||||
field,
|
||||
userId: user?.id,
|
||||
authOptions,
|
||||
recipientToken: token,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const assistant = recipient.role === RecipientRole.ASSISTANT ? recipient : undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
|
||||
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '@documenso/lib/errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { getSigningTwoFactorStatus } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/get-signing-two-factor-status';
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
|
||||
import { procedure } from '../../trpc';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusRequestSchema,
|
||||
ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusResponseSchema,
|
||||
} from './get-signing-two-factor-status.types';
|
||||
|
||||
export const getSigningTwoFactorStatusRoute = procedure
|
||||
.input(ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusRequestSchema)
|
||||
.output(ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusResponseSchema)
|
||||
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
|
||||
const { token } = input;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.logger.info({
|
||||
input: {
|
||||
token: '***',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const recipient = await prisma.recipient.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
token,
|
||||
},
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
id: true,
|
||||
envelopeId: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!recipient) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, {
|
||||
message: 'Recipient not found',
|
||||
statusCode: 404,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return await getSigningTwoFactorStatus({
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
envelopeId: recipient.envelopeId,
|
||||
sessionId: token,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
+24
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
import { z } from 'zod';
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusRequestSchema = z.object({
|
||||
token: z.string().describe('The recipient signing token from the signing URL.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusResponseSchema = z.object({
|
||||
required: z.boolean().describe('Whether external 2FA is required for this recipient.'),
|
||||
hasActiveToken: z.boolean().describe('Whether an active (unexpired) token exists.'),
|
||||
hasValidProof: z.boolean().describe('Whether a valid session proof exists.'),
|
||||
tokenExpiresAt: z.date().nullable().describe('When the active token expires, if any.'),
|
||||
proofExpiresAt: z.date().nullable().describe('When the session proof expires, if any.'),
|
||||
attemptsRemaining: z
|
||||
.number()
|
||||
.nullable()
|
||||
.describe('Remaining verification attempts for the active token.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export type TGetSigningTwoFactorStatusRequest = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusRequestSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
export type TGetSigningTwoFactorStatusResponse = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZGetSigningTwoFactorStatusResponseSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '@documenso/lib/errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { getApiTokenByToken } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/public-api/get-api-token-by-token';
|
||||
import { issueSigningTwoFactorToken } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/issue-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
|
||||
import { authenticatedProcedure } from '../../trpc';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema,
|
||||
ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema,
|
||||
issueSigningTwoFactorTokenMeta,
|
||||
} from './issue-signing-two-factor-token.types';
|
||||
|
||||
export const issueSigningTwoFactorTokenRoute = authenticatedProcedure
|
||||
.meta(issueSigningTwoFactorTokenMeta)
|
||||
.input(ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema)
|
||||
.output(ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema)
|
||||
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
|
||||
const { envelopeId, recipientId } = input;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.logger.info({
|
||||
input: {
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const authorizationHeader = ctx.req.headers.get('authorization');
|
||||
|
||||
if (!authorizationHeader) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED, {
|
||||
message: 'API token required to issue signing 2FA tokens',
|
||||
statusCode: 401,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const [token] = (authorizationHeader || '').split('Bearer ').filter((s) => s.length > 0);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!token) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.UNAUTHORIZED, {
|
||||
message: 'API token required to issue signing 2FA tokens',
|
||||
statusCode: 401,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const apiToken = await getApiTokenByToken({ token });
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await issueSigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
recipientId,
|
||||
envelopeId,
|
||||
apiTokenId: apiToken.id,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
});
|
||||
+35
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
import { z } from 'zod';
|
||||
|
||||
import type { TrpcRouteMeta } from '../../trpc';
|
||||
|
||||
export const issueSigningTwoFactorTokenMeta: TrpcRouteMeta = {
|
||||
openapi: {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
path: '/envelope/signing-2fa/issue',
|
||||
summary: 'Issue a signing 2FA token',
|
||||
description:
|
||||
'Issue a one-time signing two-factor authentication token for a recipient. The caller is responsible for delivering the token to the signer through their own channel (e.g., SMS).',
|
||||
tags: ['Envelope'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema = z.object({
|
||||
envelopeId: z.string().describe('The ID of the envelope.'),
|
||||
recipientId: z.number().describe('The ID of the recipient to issue the token for.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema = z.object({
|
||||
token: z.string().describe('The plaintext one-time token. Visible exactly once.'),
|
||||
tokenId: z.string().describe('The ID of the created token record.'),
|
||||
expiresAt: z.date().describe('When the token expires.'),
|
||||
ttlSeconds: z.number().describe('Token time-to-live in seconds.'),
|
||||
attemptLimit: z.number().describe('Maximum verification attempts allowed.'),
|
||||
issuedAt: z.date().describe('When the token was issued.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export type TIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenRequest = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
export type TIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenResponse = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZIssueSigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
import { AppError, AppErrorCode } from '@documenso/lib/errors/app-error';
|
||||
import { verifySigningTwoFactorToken } from '@documenso/lib/server-only/signing-2fa/verify-signing-two-factor-token';
|
||||
import { prisma } from '@documenso/prisma';
|
||||
|
||||
import { procedure } from '../../trpc';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema,
|
||||
ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema,
|
||||
} from './verify-signing-two-factor-token.types';
|
||||
|
||||
export const verifySigningTwoFactorTokenRoute = procedure
|
||||
.input(ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema)
|
||||
.output(ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema)
|
||||
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
|
||||
const { token, code } = input;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.logger.info({
|
||||
input: {
|
||||
token: '***',
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const recipient = await prisma.recipient.findFirst({
|
||||
where: {
|
||||
token,
|
||||
},
|
||||
select: {
|
||||
id: true,
|
||||
envelopeId: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!recipient) {
|
||||
throw new AppError(AppErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, {
|
||||
message: 'Recipient not found',
|
||||
statusCode: 404,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await verifySigningTwoFactorToken({
|
||||
recipientId: recipient.id,
|
||||
envelopeId: recipient.envelopeId,
|
||||
token: code,
|
||||
sessionId: token,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
verified: result!.verified,
|
||||
expiresAt: result!.expiresAt,
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
+23
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
import { z } from 'zod';
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema = z.object({
|
||||
token: z.string().describe('The recipient signing token from the signing URL.'),
|
||||
code: z
|
||||
.string()
|
||||
.min(6)
|
||||
.max(6)
|
||||
.regex(/^\d{6}$/)
|
||||
.describe('The 6-digit one-time code to verify.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export const ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema = z.object({
|
||||
verified: z.boolean().describe('Whether the code was successfully verified.'),
|
||||
expiresAt: z.date().describe('When the session proof expires.'),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
export type TVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenRequest = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenRequestSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
export type TVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenResponse = z.infer<
|
||||
typeof ZVerifySigningTwoFactorTokenResponseSchema
|
||||
>;
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user